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Since 1981 AIDS has killed more than 25 million people world-wide, the majority of whom lived 
within developing countries.1 The worst affected region, Sub Saharan Africa, currently has 3.5% of 
the world’s population yet 37% of the world’s people living with HIV.2 In light of the magnitude of 
the pandemic in the region it has been increasingly acknowledged that not only are HIV and AIDS 
health issues but also pervasive development issues due to the impact they have on national socio-
economic development.3 Unsurprisingly a disease of ‘sex and drugs’4 is a highly controversial and 
politicized issue. An effective response represents a serious challenge for national governance 
institutions, particularly within the unique and complex socio political environments of the region.5  
 
The need for ‘democratic governance’ and a ‘multi-sectoral’6 approach within the HIV & AIDS 
response highlights the critical role of national legislatures. Due to the severity and scope of the 
pandemic there is an assumption that elected representatives would be in the forefront of the response. 
Effective legislatures are the sine qua non of a representative democracy, and arguably an important 
vehicle through which to drive the HIV national response.7 Legislatures represent a cross section of 
society and play a central role in the coordination and implementation of national responses. Further 
understanding and explanation of legislative responses around HIV & AIDS speak to issues of 
democratic governance and the need to improve overall accountability and transparency within these 
institutions.8 Central actors in the field have recently highlighted the need for more research on the 
                                                 
1 Marais, H. 2010. Turning off the tap: Understanding and Overcoming the HIV Epidemic in Southern Africa. 2031, 
Hyperendemic pillar. Rockafeller Plaza, New York.  And Andrejevs, G. 2008. How can political action keep HIV on the top 
of the political agenda? HIV Medicine 9(2). British HIV Association. At 28. 
2 Sekgoma, B and Samuels, S. 2007 -2011. Report on Strategic Plan for Southern African Development Community – 
Parliamentary Forum on HIV/AIDS 2007 – 2011.  SADC Parliamentary Forum, HIV and AIDS Programme. Windhoek, 
Namibia. www.sadcpf.org. at 5. 
3 Caesar-Katsenga, M and Myburg, M.  2006. Parliament, Politics and AIDS A Comparative Study of Five African 
Countries. IDASA Governance and AIDS Programme.  Logo Print Cape Town. And Sekgoma, B and Samuels, S. Report on 
Strategic Plan for Southern African Development Community – Parliamentary Forum on HIV/AIDS 2007 – 2011.  SADC 
Parliamentary Forum, HIV and AIDS Programme. Windhoek, Namibia. www.sadcpf.org. at 5. 
4 Marais, H. 2010. Turning off the tap: Understanding and Overcoming the HIV Epidemic in Southern Africa. 2031, 
Hyperendemic pillar. Rockafeller Plaza, New York. And The AIDS 2031 Consortium. 2011. AIDS: Taking a Long Term 
view: The AIDS 2031 Consortium. Pearson Education Inc. FT Press. USA. 
5 Strand, P. 2007. ‘Comparing AIDS Governance: A research Agenda on Responses to AIDS Epidemic,’ in Poku, N, 
Whiteside, A and Sandkjaer, B. (eds) AIDS and Governance. Aldershot Ashgate Publishers. 
6 UNAIDS. 2005. The Three-Ones in Action: where we are and where do we go from here.  UNAIDS. Geneva, Switzerland.  
http://www.unaids.org. 
7 National Response to AIDS: More Action Needed. 2004. UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS epidemic. At 157. 
www.unaids.org. 
8 Strand, P. 2010. Making Accountability work for the AIDS Response. Global Health Governance. 4 (1). Centre for Global 















role of legislatures in country responses to AIDS.9  Although international ‘blueprints’ and calls for 
coordination, do not explicitly place legislatures at the centre of the response, there is a strong 
argument to suggest that the role of legislatures should be strengthened and supported in respect to the 
HIV/AIDS agenda. It has been posited that the HIV movement should work with individual members 
of parliament and cultivate the necessary political incentives to ensure that action around HIV & 
AIDS is taken.10  
 
Existing global HIV & AIDS governance prescriptions, and assumptions of elective representative 
response  position legislatures at the centre of the effort.  UNAIDS and other regional actors have 
called for and supported greater Legislative engagement around HIV/AIDS, and recent calls to 
implement the HIV model laws within the region, suggest a legislative mandate.The overall 
effectiveness of responses will to some extent depend on the legislatures own ability to fulfil their 
various tasks. These tasks include executing the functions of oversight, representation, law making 
and constituency service. However, as noted by Barkan,11 legislatures cannot execute all of these 
functions equally and simultaneously due to competing institutional requirements that are inherent to 
all legislatures. It is interesting, therefore to track and describe the African legislative activity around 
these four functions, and to provide more accurate information as to the role of legislatures within the 
HIV & AIDS response. Therefore the creation of an analytical framework to identify and describe 
legislative activity on the four functions is followed by an exploration of potential reasons for 
variations in legislative activity between parliaments in a set of countries.   
 
The analytical framework draws from traditional legislative theories and literature and is the first 
systematic framework to analyse all of the legislative functions, through the lens of HIV & AIDS. 
This descriptive section alone is an important contribution, not only to the understanding of 
democratic structures, but also to overall AIDS and Governance literature. The framework is applied 
to eight legislatures within the Eastern and Southern African region, each facing a generalised 
national epidemic.12 The variations in legislative activity are then explored according to established 
arguments via correlation analysis.  
 
The indiscriminate nature of the epidemic coupled with the disproportionate levels of HIV & AIDS 
within Sub Saharan Africa result in generation-long effects that undermine economic productivity, 
socio–cultural structures and national health and welfare.13 HIV & AIDS impact upon voting patterns, 
                                                 
9 Sidebe, M, Tanaka, S and Buse K. People Passion and Politics: Looking back and moving forward in the Governance of 
AIDS Response. Global Health Governance. 4 (1). Centre for Global Health Studies. Seaton Hall University. USA. 
www.ghgj.org. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Barkan, J. (ed) 2009. Legislative power in Emerging African Democracies. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Boulder, London. 
12 Countries: Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 















constituency demands and the individual legislatures. Therefore there is an expectation that African 
legislatures should have particularly high levels of activity around HIV & AIDS issues as it is clear 
that HIV &AIDS together present one of the most salient issues African legislatures will ever face. 
Unfortunately responses to the epidemic remain ‘well behind the curve’ with political leadership and 
overall accountability lacking in many parts of the world.14 African legislatures appear to offer no 
exception to this, raising questions as to what role, if any, legislatures play within HIV & AIDS 
responses.15 
 
This analysis raises questions as to what legislatures actually have been doing around HIV & AIDS 
within the eight countries, and regarding the variations between these legislatures. It further raises 
questions as to the role of legislatures in the HIV epidemic and areas where further research or action 
is required. The research further highlights the established argument that ‘cookie cutter models’16 are 
not suitable for national responses to HIV & AIDS, confirming arguments put forward by Putzel17 and 
De Waal18 that country specific approaches need to be pursued. 
 
This research speaks to the growing need to find African solutions for African problems, to be able to 
accurately evaluate the actions of institutions towards HIV & AIDS. There is a renewed interest in the 
role of legislatures in the epidemic and effective ways to mobilize and harness the capacity of 
government institutions. This research provides the first systematic framework and analysis, from 
which further case analysis and research can be done. It raises pertinent questions and provides a 









                                                 
14 The AIDS 2031 Consortium. 2011. AIDS: Taking a long term view: The AIDS 2031 Consortium. Pearson Education Inc. 
FT Press. USA. http://www.ftpress.com/store/product.aspx?isbn=0132172593 
15 De Waal, A. 2003. How will HIV/AIDS transform African Governance. African Affairs. 102 (406) Oxford University 
Press. United Kingdom. 
16 The AIDS 2031 Consortium. 2011. AIDS: Taking a long term view: The AIDS 2031 Consortium. Pearson Education Inc. 
FT Press. USA. http://www.ftpress.com/store/product.aspx?isbn=0132172593 
17 Putzel, J. 2004. The Global fight against AIDS: How adequate are the National Commissions. Journal of International 
Development. (16)  1129 – 1140. John Wiley Sons limited. UK. Available online at: available online at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com. 
18 De Waal, A. 2003. How will HIV/AIDS transform African Governance. African Affairs. 102 (406) Oxford University 




















Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
 
This chapter develops the analytical framework that is the basis for the empirical analysis of 
legislative performance in Chapters Three and Four. The framework consists of two sections: the first 
is a literature review that will identify the current state of knowledge and dominant arguments on the 
functioning of African legislatures in general and their contributions to the AIDS response in 
particular. This section will motivate for a focus on four legislative functions that will structure the 
descriptive part of the thesis, as well as generate the hypotheses that will be tested in the explanatory 
part of the thesis. The second section of this chapter will present the research design for the 
descriptive and explanatory analysis. The section will also introduce the four legislative functions in 
further detail as well as discuss how they are operationalized into variables that will be used to test 




What are African legislatures doing about HIV & AIDS? To answer this question we need to 
highlight the overall governance role legislatures play in the face of the HIV epidemic, and then, more 
specifically the role of African legislatures within the HIV epidemic. To develop a relevant research 
design and to accurately interpret the data it generates on legislative activity, the analytical framework 
must be sensitive to some general features of the political culture in which the selected legislatures are 
embedded. For this purpose, this section will review central political science literature on legislatures 
generally, and on African legislatures specifically.  
 
The important role of legislatures in the HIV epidemic has long been acknowledged, with earlier calls 
for a ‘multisectoral response’ and the realisation of the power that legislatures wield in a society, due 
to their representative and oversight roles.19  However, although there have been many studies on 
legislatures and assemblies, the majority were conducted in the late 60’s and throughout the 70’s and 
primarily focused on comparing western legislatures. Significant contributions from authors such as 
                                                 
















Mezey,20 Kornenberg,21 Copeland,22 Patterson23 and Blondel24 inter alia have informed our 
understanding of the formal legislative structures and mechanisms in several non African countries. 
Although this prior comparative research remains detached from the African context, the nature of the 
comparative studies assists in the formation of a framework for the study of African legislatures.   
 
The first generation of studies on African Legislatures came in the form of case studies with limited 
comparative scope.25 The research was often conducted by resident in-country specialists or external 
researchers who came and studied the country in isolation.26 Mezey therefore concludes that the state 
of the knowledge was that it was either conducted by researchers who had little knowledge of 
legislative structures, but much of the African context, or much understanding of western legislative 
structures, but little of the African context or application.27 Therefore early comparisons were often 
between a developing legislature and an established one, namely the US Congress.28 This made cross 
national comparisons within the existing research problematic as opposing research methodologies 
and variables were used. 29 One of the first exceptions to this is Joel Barkan’s work on African 
legislatures, specifically Kenya and South Africa. Consistent methodological approaches and 
variables where utilized in these studies, informed by sound research and understanding of the country 
contexts.30  
 
The research currently underway at the University of Cape Town, the African Legislatures Project 
under direction of Professors Robert Mattes, Shaheen Mozaffar and Joel Barkan inter alia31 seeks to 
address this gap in the study of African legislatures through the creation of a comparative framework 
through which these African legislatures can be assessed. Several aspects of this research are of 
                                                 
20Mezey, M. 1983.  The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 8(4) Comparative 
Legislative Research Centre.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/439701 Accessed: 07/08/2009.  And  Mezey,  M. 1979. 
Comparative Legislatures. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina. USA. 
21Kornberg, A and Musolf, L. 1970. On Legislatures in Developmental Perspective. In Kornberg, A and Musolf, L. (eds) 
1970. Legislatures in Developmental Perspective. Duke University Press. USA. 
22Copeland, G and Patterson, S. (eds) 1994.  Parliaments in the Modern World: Changing Institutions. University of 
Michigan Press. Ann Arbor. USA. 
23Ibid. 
24 Blondel, J. 1973. Comparative Legislatures. Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. USA. 
25 Nijzink, L, Mozaffar, S. Azevedo. E. 2006. Can Parliaments enhance the quality of democracy on the African Continent? 
An Analysis of the Institutional Capacity and public perceptions. Democracy and Africa Research Unit. CSSR Working 
Paper No 160. Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. South Africa. 
26Mezey, M. 1983.  The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 8(4) Comparative 
Legislative Research Centre.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/439701. Accessed: 07/08/2009. and Mezey, M. 1979. Comparative 
Legislatures. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina. USA  
27Ibid. and Mezey, M. 1979. Comparative Legislatures. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina. USA 
28Copeland, G and Patterson, S. (eds) 1994.  Parliaments in the Modern World: Changing Institutions. University of 
Michigan Press. Ann Arbor. USA. 
29 Lofchie, M. 1968. Political Theory and African Politics. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 6. 1. Cambridge 
University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/158673 Accessed: 07/08/2009.  At 3-15. 
30Barkan, J. (ed) 2009. Legislative power in Emerging African Democracies. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Boulder, London. 
At 8. 
31Mozaffar, S. 2005. Everything you ever wanted to know about African Legislatures but were afraid to ask.  Centre for 
African Studies Gallery, Ground Level, Harry Oppenheimer, Institute building, Upper Campus. Graduate School of 















particular relevance to this paper - including the comprehensive tracking of bills, interviews with 
Members of Parliament and information on civil society engagement. Data collected on individual 
health and HIV/AIDS committees by the African Legislatures Project (ALP) further contributes to 
this paper. A recent book published by Mohammed Salih highlights the difference between African 
legislatures and traditional Western ones.32 This book offers reasons for the difference and highlights 
the different nature of African legislatures and the impact this difference has on overall legislative 
functioning. The functions of African legislatures are discussed in this publication, offering further 
clarity. Although Salih’s publication does not provide a comparative framework for assessing African 
legislatures, much of the qualitative discussion informs the contextual environment and enriches an 
understanding of African legislative structures.33 
 
Work by both Barkan34 and Mohammed Salih35 suggest that African legislatures may have different 
strengths than legislatures in the US and Europe. Barkan submits that African legislatures exercise 
high levels of constituency service, potentially offering an explanation for the weakness of the other 
functions.36 Mohammed Salih argues that stronger representative functions within African legislatures 
result in an improved response to social problems. 37 Tension between the different legislative 
functions is inherent in all legislatures, and this must be borne in mind when undertaking any study on 
legislatures, their performance or functions.38 
 
Clapham argues that African legislatures often lack the institutional memory and history of the more 
established legislatures and many lack autonomy and the capacity to develop suitable functions 
tailored to the country context.39 Corruption and inefficiency are compounded by resource constraints 
and existing systems of patrimonialism, clientelism and ‘big man’ politics.40 African legislatures exist 
in a socio political context that is different from their European counterparts. Research by Van de 
Walle41 and others highlights the practices of patriarchy and clientilism in African governance, and 
identifies the ways in which this influences policy formation and institutional functioning. Efforts to 
build legislative capacity in Africa must acknowledge these competing and complex dynamics. 
                                                 
32 Mohammed Salih, M. A. (ed). 2005. African Parliaments: Between governance and governing. HSRC Press. South Africa. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Barkan, J. (ed) 2009. Legislative power in Emerging African Democracies. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Boulder, London. 
At 8. 
35 Mohammed Salih, M. A. (ed). 2005. African Parliaments: Between governance and governing. HSRC Press. South Africa. 
36 Barkan, J. (ed) 2009. Legislative power in Emerging African Democracies. Lynne Reinner Publishers. Boulder, London. 
At 8. 
37Mohammed Salih, M. A. (ed). 2005. African Parliaments: Between governance and governing. HSRC Press. South Africa. 
At 6. 
38Barkan, J, Mattes, M, Mozaffar, S and Smiddy, K. 2009. African Legislatures First Findings. African Legislatures Project. 
http://www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/publications. 
39 Clapham, C.  1998. Discerning the New Africa. International Affairs. 74(2). Blackwell Publishers, London. At 263 – 503. 
40 Ibid.And Mezey, M. 1983. The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 8(4) 
Comparative Legislative Research Centre. http://www.jstor.org/stable/439701 Accessed: 07/08/2009. And  















Indeed, as noted by one such project: “strengthening parliaments isn’t simply a capacity issue; it’s an 
intensely political issue.”42  
 
Literature on both African and Western legislatures informs the selection of four legislative functions 
for this paper. An empirical framework by which legislative functioning around HIV & AIDS can be 
assessed is divided into four core indicators: Law making, oversight, representation or civil society 
engagement and constituency service. Each of these four indicators exists in both longer-established 
as well as African legislatures and activity around each of them vary, due to overall institutional, 
political and cultural contexts. The degree to which legislatures perform these functions in relation to 
issues pertinent to HIV & AIDS provides an understanding of the overall legislative performance on 
HIV & AIDS. 
 
Despite the important role legislatures play in country responses to HIV & AIDS, few academic 
studies exist on African legislative responses to HIV & AIDS. Much of the existing literature is drawn 
from conference papers, reports handbooks and guides, highlighting the discourse and value of the 
topic. 
 
The Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) published  study in 2006 in which they looked at the 
relationship between legislatures, politics and AIDS in five African countries.43 To date this appears 
to be the only systematic comparative analysis of African legislatures and their response to HIV & 
AIDS. IDASA’s five country analysis sets out to determine whether ‘Parliaments can and have made 
significant contributions to the national HIV/AIDS responses, in particular via the use of the 
parliamentary oversight function.’44 The primary research goal is to identify ways to improve the 
overall effectiveness of parliaments in national HIV/AIDS responses,45with particular focus on the 
oversight function. The study includes five African countries; Botswana, Ghana, Mozambique, South 
Africa and Kenya, and is a snap-shot analysis focussing primarily on the oversight function of these 
legislatures.46  This study highlights the importance and relevance of this legislative function in 
combating the epidemic and provides a useful framework for evaluation of the unique and pivotal role 
individual parliamentarians’ play. This study contributes some key recommendations for legislative 
strengthening and calls for strong leadership and full engagement of parliamentarians.47 
 
                                                 
42Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support. 2008. A Report by the Africa all Party Parliamentary Group. 
House of Commons. London. at 10.  
43Caesar-Katseng, M and Myburg, M. 2006. Parliament, Politics and AIDS.  A Comparative Study of Five African 
Countries. IDASA, Governance and AIDS Programme. Logo Print, Cape Town. South Africa. 
44Ibid. At 1. 
45Ibid. At 1. 
















The main limitation of the IDASA is its singular focus on the oversight function. Further, more 
consideration should have been given to contextual elements that influence legislative activity in 
Africa, as this provides a better understanding of the variations and differences in activity. An 
evaluation of overall legislative performance around HIV & AIDS needs not only to consider the 
overall institutional functions but also the inherent legislative institutional tensions that exist within all 
legislatures,48 and the socio cultural and political influences that alter activity and performance. The 
IDASA study focuses on the role of the individual parliamentarian as opposed to the institutional 
structure on a whole. 
 
The Regional Network for Equity in Health in East and Southern Africa (EQUINET) has published 
several papers specifically relating to parliamentary/legislative committees and the provision of health 
equity in the region, of which an HIV & AIDS response should be considered a key feature.49 Similar 
to the IDASA research, EQUINET highlights the important role parliaments play in health within the 
region50 through exercising oversight (specifically budget oversight) law-making and representation. 
The EQUINET papers provide additional material to assist in the operationalization of the legislative 
functions of oversight, legislation, representation and budget allocation.51 The EQUINET papers bear 
some overlap with research in this thesis, but differ in their broad focus on health as opposed to an 
HIV & AIDS specific focus.  
 
EQUINET’s research focuses on the parliamentary committees within the Eastern and Southern 
African region, the region most affected by the epidemic.52 The data collected through their research 
addresses a significant research gap with n the AIDS and Governance field and makes informed and 
critical recommendations to individual parliamentarians within the region.53 EQUINET’s ten country 
study provides critical and comprehensive data for analysis and activity around health and HIV & 
AIDS.  Although they look at the important role of individual parliamentarians and individual health 
committees, they contribute to overall understanding of the legislative institutions on a whole. The 
strength of this research is in the broad scope of the data and the important recommendations and 
suggestions made to legislatures in this affected region. 
                                                 
48 Barkan, J, Mattes, M, Mozaffar, S and Smiddy, K. 2009. African Legislatures First Findings. African Legislatures Project. 
http://www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/publications. 
49 Loewenson R,  London L, Thomas J, Mbombo N, Mulumba M, Kadungure A, Manga N, Mukono A.2009. Experiences of 
Parliamentary Committees on Health in promoting health equity in East and Southern Africa ’ EQUINET Discussion Paper 
Series 73. UCT, TARSC, SEAPACOH: EQUINET, Harare. 
50 Ibid. And  London L. Mbombo N, Thomas J, Loewenson R, Mulumba M, Mukono A. 2009. ‘Parliamentary committee 
experiences on promoting the right to health in east and southern Africa’. EQUINET Discussion Paper 74.  EQUINET. 
UCT, TARSC, SEAPACOH: EQUINET, Harare. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Marais, H. 2010. Turning off the tap: Understanding and Overcoming the HIV Epidemic in Southern Africa. 2031, 
Hyperendemic pillar. Rockafeller Plaza, New York. And The AIDS 2031 Consortium. 2011. AIDS: Taking a Long Term 
view: The AIDS 2031 Consortium. Pearson Eduction Inc. FT Press. USA. 
53 Loewenson R,  London L, Thomas J, Mbombo N, Mulumba M, Kadungure A, Manga N, Mukono A.2009. Experiences of 
Parliamentary Committees on Health in promoting health equity in East and Southern Africa ’ EQUINET Discussion Paper 
















The National Democratic Institute for Democratic Affairs (NDI), in collaboration with SADC PF 
published the report: Survey of Legislative efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in the Southern African 
Development (SADC) Region.54 The report emphasises the important role parliaments and legislatures 
play in addressing the multi-sectoral approach required to combat the HIV & AIDS epidemic. The 
survey is focused on the SADC region and looks at legislative institutions on a whole.55 The report 
differs from the EQUINET and IDASA reports as it looks broadly at several different parliamentary 
functions, and does not restrict its scope to the role of individual members of Parliament. It concludes 
that, although African parliaments and legislatures appear to have adopted respective National 
Strategic Plans and committed to multi-sectoral responses for HIV & AIDS, few have established 
committees to specifically deal with HIV & AIDS and many are failing to sufficiently enact HIV & 
AIDS related legislation.56  
 
Amid claims that African legislatures are not taking full advantage of their ‘constitutionally mandated 
powers to address HIV & AIDS,’57 Glassman58 and the World Bank explore; How Parliamentarians 
can Help Ensure Accountability for Spending on HIV/AIDS and Reproductive Health.59  This 
publication specifically looks at the role of Parliamentarians in ensuring accountability for HIV & 
AIDS spending.60 The focus on legislative oversight over the HIV & AIDS budget points to the 
important role of legislatures and individual parliamentarians. The report highlights some of the 
limitations of legislatures, while clearly operationalizing legislative functions.61 Both the Glassman 
and the EQUINET articles provide important quantitative and qualitative information for the 
operationalization of the descriptive variables and for a deeper understanding of the limitations and 
roles of African Parliaments. 
 
Organisations such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)62, Southern Africa HIV and AIDS 
information dissemination service (SAfAIDS)63 the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF),64 Health 
                                                 
54Musavengana, T. (ed) 2004. Survey of Legislative Efforts to Combat HIV/AIDs in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Region. Report on the survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 




58 Glassman, A. 2007. How Parliamentarians can Help Ensure Accountability for Spending on HIV/AIDS and Reproductive 




62 Taking Action against HIV and AIDS. Handbook for Parliamentarians. 2007. No 15/2007. Inter parliamentary Union, 
UNAIDS, UNDP. Available online: http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/aids07-e.pdf. 
6350 by 15: Intesifying HIV Prevention in Southern Africa: Action Toolkit for Parliamentarians and Civil Society. 2010. 
SAfAIDS and SADC PF. Available online: http://www.safaids.net/?q=node/1281. 
64 Sekogma, B and Samuels, S. 2007. Report on Strategic Plan for Southern African Development Community – 
Parliamentary Forum on HIV/AIDS 2007- 2011.  SADC Parliamentary Forum, HIV and AIDS Programme. Windhoek, 















Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division (HEARD)65 and the Southern and East African 
Parliamentary Alliance of Committees on Health (SEPACOH)66 among others, have produced 
manuals and guidance handbooks to support increased Parliamentary action around HIV & AIDS in 
African countries.  
 
The conference reports, handbooks and guides provided by HEARD, SAfAIDS, SADC PF and IPU 
all highlight the important role of legislatures within the context of the HIV pandemic. However, due 
to the nature of this literature, none seek to undertake a rigorous comparative analysis or data of the 
African legislative responses to HIV & AIDS. As in the EQUINET papers, many of the reports 
approach the HIV and legislative relationship from the perspective of the Member of Parliament or 
member of civil society and the actions each individual may take in their own capacity.67 Although 
these papers may not provide academic analyses or data, each informs the discourse around the role of 
Parliaments and each highlights areas of action, including goal setting. In order to strengthen the 
literature on the governance of the AIDS response, however, research needs a stronger theoretical 
grounding. It must be based on more extensive data, and must seek to assess the contribution by 
parliaments at an institutional level. This research aims to make a solid contribution in these regards.   
 
Research Design and Methodology 
Case selection 
This paper is a cross national, small-N comparative analysis of the legislatures in eight African 
countries: Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. All 
of these countries fall within the most affected region of the world, Eastern and Southern Africa 
(ESA), where all countries are facing either hyper endemic or generalised epidemics.68  
 
The selection of countries to include in the study was influenced by two main considerations. Firstly, 
an active role by parliaments in the response is arguably most needed where the epidemic is most 
severe, hence the focus on the ESA region. Although the epidemic is extraordinarily severe across the 
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region, previous analyses have identified variations in the type and intensity of parliamentary 
performance in the response to AIDS. A systematic and comprehensive description of these variations 
and an exploration of factors that may explain them will generate new knowledge with relevance for 
efforts to further strengthen parliaments’ capacity to act constructively within the overall country 
response to HIV & AIDS. Such an analysis also has the potential to contribute to a more general 
literature on parliaments’ role in African democracies.  
 
This thesis is an analysis of institutional performance. The second consideration for the selection of 
cases was therefore governed by the availability of data on parliamentary performance at an 
institutional level. The African Legislatures project has collected data on: specific parliamentary 
committees, on individual Members of Parliament, the law making function of the legislature and the 
overall institutional design of the legislature. This data has been collected via surveys and primary 
data collection. At the time of this thesis, only a small selection of legislatures had been completed, 
thereby restricting the number of legislatures that could be analysed. 
 
The above stated reasons for the selection of cases imply that there is no basis for arguing that the 
eight parliaments that are included in the study are representative, in a statistical sense, of a larger 
group of cases, such as all parliaments in the ESA region or across Africa. However, the more general 
findings in this research nevertheless provide an evidence-base that provides a point of comparison 
when discussing parliaments not included in this analysis.   
 
The data in this research paper have been collected via both primary and secondary research and are 
both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Although many of these data derive from desktop research, 
gaps in the data have resulted in personal interviews, email correspondence and investigation. This 
paper is the first of its kind to attempt to investigate African legislative institutions and their functions 
with regard to HIV & AIDS using these specific variables and measurement. It is a unique piece of 
research that utilizes the African Legislatures project, UNAIDS data and other data from NGO’s, 
primary research and theories of political science to provide a comprehensive exploratory analysis of 
legislative activity. 
 
Dependent variable: parliamentary functions 
The thesis will assess parliamentary performance on four central parliamentary functions: law 
making, oversight, legislative engagement with civil society and constituency service. The variables 
that capture these functions were created by aggregating data from several sources, as will be detailed 
in the following sections and further in chapter three. Each of these aggregate indices  has several sub 
categories that independently measure different aspects. These aggregate indices have been created 















relating to the overall aggregate function.. In the final part of this paper a composite score is derived 
from analysis of these aggregate indices and used to evaluate the legislative activity in each of the 
eight countries. 
Law- making  
 
The law making function is executed in legislatures, through the creation and passing of laws and the 
formulation of policies,69 literally, legislatures ‘amend, create and sanction laws.’70 Although many 
policies emanate from the executive, the ability of parliaments to mould and influence the policies 
independent to the executive is a measure of their own independence and strength.71 In addressing the 
HIV & AIDS pandemic appropriate legislation needs to be introduced to protect all citizens, including 
those living with HIV and vulnerable sub populations such as sex workers (SW), men who have sex 
with men (MSM), and injecting drug users (IDU). In addition to this Parliaments need to ensure that 
their national strategy is updated and regularly reviewed to accommodate all sections of society in the 
pursuit of epidemic management. Legislation needs to be introduced to protect all citizens from 
discrimination and stigma and ensure universal access to life saving medications and to health 
services more generally. 
 
This aggregate construct is consists of eight subcategories, all of which measure the law-making 
function within a legislature: (1) number of new bills introduced the explicitly mention HIV in the 
title;72 (2) number of new bills passed that explicitly mention HIV in the title;73 (3) number of bills 
referred to the health committee;74 (4) country review of the national policy on HIV/AIDS; (5) law 
that protects PLWHA from discrimination;  (6) obstacles in the protection of vulnerable groups; (7) 
laws that present obstacles to the protection of vulnerable groups, and; (8) laws that criminalize MSM, 
SW and IDU.75 The data for each of these subcategories is collected from two sources; The African 
Legislatures project and UNAIDS.76 
Legislative Engagement with Civil Society 
 
Traditionally the representative function is executed when members represent the views of their 
constituents within the house. However, for the purposes of this research this aggregate indices will be 
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measured by the frequency and degree to which civil society can engage and does engages with the 
legislature around HIV & AIDS issues. Whether or not civil society organisations have opportunity to 
participate in debates and governance processes that shape parliamentary activity will be measured 
through six sub-categories: (1) civil society input into new bills;77 (2) whether or not the chair of the 
parliamentary committee meets with civil society;78 (3) whether parliamentary meetings within the 
committee tasked with HIV & AIDS are held in camera or in the open;79 (4) the number of civil 
society presentations in the committee tasked with HIV & AIDS;80 (5) percentage of MP’s who turn 
to either civil society or academia for research and information81 and, finally; (6) the level of civil 
society involvement in the National Strategic plan.82 The data for this aggregateindices primarily 
comes from the African Legislatures project 
Oversight 
 
The oversight function can be executed with regard to the budget and in the monitoring of the 
executive and its expenditure. However additional legislative influence over the structure of the 
budget, questions directed to the executive and the promotion of debate are also considered oversight 
functions.83 Although, data is limited on legislative influence over the budget components specifically 
related to HIV & AIDS, EQUINET’s study on Parliamentary roles around the monitoring and 
engagement with the executive and around the Abuja Commitment to health spending highlights the 
role Parliaments can play with regard to the health budget.84 Therefore, this function will be measured 
by two variables: oversight over the budget and versight in the committee. Oversight of the budget is 
important for accountability, particularly when faced with an epidemic that places such extreme 
financial burdens on the state.85  
 
Whether or not there is an active and well-staffed committee, specifically created to address HIV & 
AIDS issues, or an existing committee tasked with HIV – may influence execution of oversight.86 The 
three subcategories to this aggregate indices are the following: (1) what do MP’s think about the 
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parliamentary influence over the budget and the monitoring of the executive;87 (2) what is the 
percentage of total government expenditure directed to health between 2003 – 200688 and; (3) what 
are the committee budget priorities and what is the content of questions raised with the executive?89 
With regard to an HIV & AIDS specific committee, or committee tasked with HIV & AIDS the six 
questions are: (1) does such a committee exist; (2) what is the degree of activity; (3) what is the 
funding and budget situation; (4) what is the medical and technical expertise of the chair and the 
members; (5) how many special investigations have there been, and; (6) was a committee report 
produced, tabled and debated?90  
Constituency Service 
 
Constituency Service91 entails individual legislators acting individually to perform certain functions 
and activities within their respective constituencies. These actions can vary, but normally involve 
routine visits, funding of individual needs and the involvement in small to medium scale development 
projects.92 For the purposes of this research, the level of constituency service will be measured by the 
amount of money spent in the constituency in a given year, of a personal and project nature, and the 
frequency of the visits and length of stay in this same constituency.93 The subcategories of this 
variable includes: (1) the percentage of time devoted to the constituency in days (in and out of 
session); (2) the length of stay in the constituency (in and out of session); (3) the level of project-
related donations in the constituency, and (4) the level of personal donations to members of the 
constituency. Calculation of the expenditure has been converted to the US dollar exchange rate during 
the year that the survey took place. 
 
The section above details how the four parliamentary functions will be captured by five variables. It is 
important to note here that two of the five variables are concerned with the oversight function; 
oversight generally and oversight of the budget, therefore despite their only being four function 
variables, for the purposes of this study there are five variables. As data on these variables is 
presented in chapter three it will be further specified how the subcategories are aggregated into a 
value – a ‘score’ – for each variable, and also how the five variables are aggregated into an overall 
composite variable. The five variables, plus the overall composite variable, are all dependent variables 
in this analysis as they capture different aspects of parliamentary performance on HIV/AIDS.   
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Explanatory variables: context and institutions 
 
The ambition of this thesis is not only to identify variations in performance between the eight 
parliaments, but also to do initial statistical tests to see which variables may contribute to explanations 
of the variation. As noted above, it is important to consider the socio cultural and political dynamics 
in which the legislatures exist, as a variety of factors may influence legislative activity on HIV & 
AIDS. The thesis will use statistical analysis to explore whether there are any tendencies in the data 
that would suggest links between the six dependent variables and six independent variables. The six 
independent variables are: (1) the severity of the HIV epidemic; (2) the duration of the National AIDS 
Council; (3) the financial resources available to the legislature (measured by GNI per capita); (4) the 
quality of governance generally; (5) the electoral system; (6) whether parliament functions in a 
presidential or parliamentary system, and; (7) the nature of public opinion on HIV & AIDS. Each of 
these variables will be discussed further in the following paragraphs.  
 
The severity of the epidemic is measured by HIV prevalence in the adult population, based on data 
from 2007, as presented by UNAIDS. HIV prevalence is used here as a proxy to indicate the overall 
severity, or scope, of the epidemic in the eight countries. Whereas other information – such as data on 
HIV incidence, demand for treatment and/or total expenditure on HIV & AIDS – would have given 
other nuances to the measure, HIV prevalence is arguably a reasonable proxy for the purposes of this 
analysis. The expectation on this variable is that more severe epidemics will motivate greater activity 
by the legislatures, as measured by all dependent variables. The necessity to respond would be higher 
due to the devastating effects of the disease.  
 
The international blueprint for the institutionalisation of the AIDS response is captured in the notion 
of the ‘three ones’. Countries should have one national policy framework, one system to monitor and 
evaluate the response, and one national coordinating authority.94 This authority, a National AIDS 
Council, must coordinate the roles of other institutions to ensure a smooth governance process, 
including legislative activity. The formation and funding of the National AIDS councils located 
within the health ministries in the 1980 signalled an international acknowledgment of the scale and 
importance of the HIV epidemic.95 Additional funding flowed in with the conditionality that the 
existing councils be revised to address a call for a multi sectoral approach under the ‘Three Ones 
                                                 
94 UNAIDS. 2005. The Three-Ones in Action: where we are and where do we go from here. UNAIDS. Geneva, Switzerland.  
http://www.unaids.org. 
95 England, R. 2006. Viewpoint: Coordinating HIV control efforts: what to do with the National AIDS Commissions. The 















Principles’.96  In theory this organisational blueprint would coordinate all funds, actions and groups 
around a common agenda, streamlining the government response and improving overall effectiveness 
of the national response. This emerged out of the belief that the existing councils, located within the 
health ministries were unable to adequately address the social and behavioural issues and therefore 
required a more holistic coordination authority.97 In theory the implementation and subsequent set up 
of the NAC’s should have streamlined and improved the national HIV & AIDS responses. It is 
asserted by UNAIDS that a functioning National AIDS Council increases legislative efficiency 
around the HIV & AIDS issue.98 This assumption has been questioned by Putzel and others who 
instead argue that they tend to undermine the national response.99  Putzel argues inter alia, that since 
the powers of the NAC were never clearly identified they caused complications and confusions and a 
general bureaucratic overburdening of the governance system, thus undermining the effectiveness of 
the national response.100 A qualitative comparative study by SAHARA on National AIDS Councils in 
five African countries explores the efficiency and influence, and informs the discussion and 
operationalization of this variable.101 However, no comparable data is available to capture the 
effectiveness of the NACs in the eight countries included in this study. The variable will therefore use 
the number of years that the NACs has been in existence as a proxy for their effectiveness. While it is 
clear that NACs will need time to get established and develop processes to fulfil their mandate, it is 
equally clear that their effectiveness will depend also on a host of other factors, including 
independence, mandate and internal financial and institutional capacity A separate study on the 
independence, mandate and internal capacity of the National AIDS councils would be of great use to 
further evaluate their effectiveness, unfortunately this is out of the scope of this study and a proxy 
measurement is used to provide an indication of activity. Until such more nuanced data becomes 
available, duration of activity will have to suffice as a proxy. The imprecision of the measure will be 
taken into account when the results of the analysis are interpreted.  
 
The issue of financial capacity is often raised in discussions of African legislatures, or African 
institutions on a whole.102 Cash-strapped societies often have a reduced capacity to respond in the 
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same manner as their wealthier counterparts103 therefore reducing their overall institutional response 
and effectiveness. Capacity, or the financial resources available to the legislature, as measured by the 
overall GNI per capita (PPP USD) by the World Bank is therefore an important explanatory variable 
to include when exploring the variations between legislative activity and functioning.104 
 
The understanding that good governance is required to adequately respond to the epidemic is central 
in the literature.105  The data used for this variable comes from the ‘accountability and corruption’ 
element of the Mo Ibrahim governance index from 2008.106. The expectation on this variable is that 
we will see higher parliamentary activity in countries with better governance.  
 
Work by Barkin107 and IDASA108 both note that the type of electoral system influences legislative 
functioning. In countries with Proportional Representation (PR) systems lower levels of 
representation should be expected, compared with levels within ‘First Past The Post’ countries 
(FPTP).109  Higher levels of constituency service are also expected in First Past the Post systems, 
while law making and oversight functions should be stronger in PR systems. Differing electoral 
systems may help explain why not all legislatures in Africa are able to perform on the same level, as 
there are inherent tensions within the institutional design that influence overall institutional activity.110 
The case selection in this paper includes electoral systems from First Past The Post, and Proportional 
Representation systems. Exploring parliamentary functioning and activity around HIV & AIDS while 
noting the difference between electoral systems, is an important consideration in this paper.  
 
Similarly, the institutional design regarding Presidential or Parliamentary systems will also be looked 
at with cognizance of the existent ‘big man’ politics of many African countries. The existence of 
either a parliamentary system or a presidential system will influence the degree of power and control 
the parliament has within the country. It can be asserted that legislative performance within 
parliamentary systems should be higher than in countries with presidential systems. 
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In democracies, parliaments and legislatures are meant to reflect and represent, in broad terms, the 
political sentiments held by the voting public; in other words, legislatures should be representative of 
dominant opinions in the voting public.111 Whether or not public opinion on the governance of the 
response to HIV & AIDS has an impact on parliamentary activity will be measured with two variables 
in the third round of the Afrobarometer public opinion surveys.112 The first capture the percentage of 
people who feel AIDS is one of the three most important problems that their government should 
address, and the second capture the percentage of people who think their Government has performed 
badly in the response to HIV & AIDS during the year prior to the survey (2007). The expectation is to 
find higher parliamentary activity in countries where more people prioritize AIDS, and similarly in 
countries where more people are critical of Government performance. Salih113 asserts that African 
parliaments are more effective in responding to social problems and the common public interest than 
in governance roles, which would allocate a certain weight to the role of public opinion.114 De Waal 
notes however that governments only act when there is a real perceived threat to their power, and 
often respond very late.115 In light of these two arguments the role and impact of public opinion on 
overall legislative activity is important. 
 
Leadership, particularly executive leadership, around HIV & AIDS is highlighted in responses to the 
epidemic due to success stories from; inter alia, Senegal nd Uganda. Successful results in Uganda 
have been attributed to Museveni’s enlightened leadership. A growing body of literature demonstrates 
the link between active vocal, HIV & AIDS aware leaders and increased national HIV & AIDS 
response and it has been asserted that stronger leadership promotes a better HIV & AIDS response. 
Patterson116 and Whiteside117 for example emphasise the important role leadership plays, both on an 
international and a national level in fighting HIV & AIDS. 
 
 In executive dominant African Parliaments, riddled with ‘Big- man’ Politics – tracking examples of 
good leadership around HIV/AIDS, while exploring the link with Parliamentary activity becomes an 
interesting pursuit.118 Patterson119 and Whiteside120 emphasise the important role leadership plays, 
both on an international and a national level in fighting HIV/AIDS. It has been asserted that stronger 
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leadership promotes a better HIV/AIDS response however a powerful leader may overshadow a 
parliament, reducing its function or alternatively drive parliamentary activity around an issue the 
executive believes is important. It is therefore interesting to consider the role of leadership within the 
























































Legislatures are the central governance institution for political deliberation, legislation, oversight of 
the executive and representation of public and stakeholder opinions.121 With such core functions in the 
democratic process, effective legislatures are essential to ensure good governance and they are a 
necessary – albeit not a sufficient – factor for the consolidation of democracy.122 Although many 
African legislatures are relatively young compared to legislatures in Europe, Mohammed Salih argues 
that they have begun to wield greater power and influence in the shaping of legislation, oversight of 
the executive and the creation of the necessary link between the governed and the governing.123 
 
In order to address the HIV pandemic, a coordinated multi-sectoral response has been called for. This 
response presents a significant challenge for governments in the region.124 It requires the coordination 
of health ministries, national AIDS-coordinating agencies, international donors, civil society, 
government and the public at large, within resource-constrained and politically divided environments. 
It is an arduous and complex task resulting in many shortfalls and duplications in the approach.125 Due 
to their unique governance powers, legislatures play a critical role in the multi-sectoral approach.  
 
To accurately answer the question, “What are African legislatures doing about HIV & AIDS?” it is 
necessary to track and describe legislative activity around the four aggregate indices mentioned in 
Chapter 2. It is broadly accepted that the functions of legislatures include, oversight, representation 
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and law-making,126 while the work of Barkan127 extends this set of functions to include constituency 
service.  
 
Opposing narratives exist on how African states and legislatures respond to and manage HIV & 
AIDS. There is an assertion that many African countries still lack adequate HIV & AIDS legislation 
and policies and remain insufficiently coordinated to address the pandemic.128 Political leadership is 
still shrouded in stigma and shame and resource-constrained environments limit parliamentary 
capacities.129 However, it has also been noted that legislatures hold more power now than they have 
since independence and the frequency with which they are shaping and influencing legislation 
independent of the executive, has increased. 130 
 
A description of the activity around the four key legislative functions will further clarify and improve 
the understanding of parliamentary activity around HIV & AIDS. 
Law-making 
 
The law-making function, as defined in Chapter 2, is executed in the legislatures through the creation 
and passing of laws and policies. 131 Most SADC countries a pear to have insufficient legislation to 
protect citizens’ rights with regard to HIV & AIDS and several have recently introduced laws that 
actively undermine the rights of vulnerable sub-populations.132 The Homosexuality Bill in Uganda 
would be an example of such legislation.133 In addition to this, laws that criminalize transmission of 
HIV also exist and undermine overall goals of epidemic management in Sub-Saharan Africa.134 
Legislation needs to be introduced to protect all citizens from discrimination and stigma and ensure 
universal access to life-saving medications. 
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The table below tracks legislative activity on the law-making variable in the eight countries in this 
study. Focus on the creation and passing of new HIV-specific legislation, the revision of the national 
HIV & AIDS policies and the existence of discriminatory laws have been recorded in an attempt to 
provide an understanding of legislative activity in each country. This table records the number of new 
bills, both introduced and passed, that explicitly mention HIV or AIDS in the title. In addition to this 
it records the number of bills annually referred to the health committee, HIV Committee, or 
committee tasked with HIV & AIDS. It records whether or not the individual country has reviewed 
national HIV & AIDS policy and if the country has a law that protects people living with HIV/AIDS 
(PLWHA) from discrimination. Finally, this table records whether or not laws exist in the country that 
present obstacles to the protection of vulnerable sub-groups, including laws that criminalize men who 
have sex with men (MSM), sex workers (SW) and injecting drug users(IDU). It should be noted here 
that the information contained in the table was collected between the years of 2002 – 2008. Although 
several of the countries in this case study have since amended or altered their i dividual laws, these 
alterations will not be reflected in this study. Kenya and Mozambique135 are examples where positive 
amendments have been made, including updating and revision of the National Strategy and the 
introduction of new legislation. Uganda is a negative example, due to the recent proposal to introduce 
anti homosexual legislation.136 
 
On the first look at this data, it appears that all countries, with the exception of Kenya, have a law that 
protects PLWHA from discrimination. However, despite this positive point, all these countries also 
have laws that present obstacles to the protection of vulnerable sub-groups, and, with the exception of 
South Africa, all the countries in the case selection have laws that criminalize MSM. Therefore it 
could be deduced from this that the legal environment for the HIV & AIDS response contains internal 
contradictions in many countries. 
 
With reference to the first two columns, introduction and passing of legislation (explicitly mentioning 
HIV in the title), it appears that the majority of the countries are showing some, albeit limited, levels 
of activity on these variables. These levels of activity are a positive indication of parliamentary 
activity, although when compared with the stark realties that these same countries continue to have 
laws that present obstacles to the protection of vulnerable subgroups, and laws that criminalize MSM, 
it is clear that much work needs to still be done around the important HIV & AIDS agenda. 
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Kenya 1 1 13 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Malawi 2 2 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Mozambique 1 1 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Namibia 0 0 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes no Yes 
South Africa 1 0 4 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania 1 1 0 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Uganda 0 0 1 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Zambia 0 0 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Sources: African Legislatures Project and UNAIDS 
 
Law-making Table 2: 
Law-making Table 2 captures information around two questions; (1.) Does the parliament have too 
much control, about the right amount or too little control over the content of legislation? (2.) Has the 
effectiveness of parliament over the past five years become worse, stayed the same, become better, do 
not know, with regard to making laws? 137  Both questions were asked of Members of Parliament in 
the respective countries and the data has been collected by the African Legislatures Project. The table 
shows the distribution of MP responses across the various response options as a percentages of the 
total number of MPs that were interviewed within the study. 
 
When asked about the ‘parliamentary influence on the content of legislation’, it appears that the 
majority of MP’s in six out of the eight countries believe that the legislative influence is ‘about right’ 
or too little’. This is consistent with the understanding that African Democracies that appear to have 
relatively weak legislatures struggle under heavy executive dominance. It is intriguing to note that the 
two exceptions, Namibia and Tanzania, surprisingly, and overwhelmingly, believe that legislative 
influence on the content of legislation is too much.  
 
When asked the question, ‘parliamentary effectiveness in lawmaking, over the past five years’ 
minority percentages identify that parliamentary effectiveness has worsened in the eight countries. In 
Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia, the majority belief is that legislative effectiveness has 
remained the same, while in Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania the majority believe that 
legislative effectiveness has improved over the last five years. It is interesting to note that the majority 
                                                 















of the MP’s interviewed in these eight countries believe that legislative effectiveness has either stayed 
the same or improved over the last five years, suggesting revision, reform and positive activity within 
the legislatures as a whole. It is important to note, however, that this second question, does not 
allocate a weighting or illicit judgment on the value of parliamentary effectiveness, but simply asks if 
parliamentary effectiveness has worsened, improved or stayed the same in the preceding five- year 
period. 
Law-making Table 2: Opinions of Members of Parliament 
 
Legislative Table 2 - Opinions of Members of Parliament (%) 
  
Does the parliament have too much, about the right amount or too little 
control over the content of legislation Has parliamentary effectiveness over the past 5 years got worse, 
stayed the same or got better with regard to making laws 
 
Country Too much About right Too little Worse Stayed the same Better 
Kenya 6 47 47 14 45 41 
Malawi 2 63 31 25 23 37 
Mozambique 12 42 44 6 30 64 
Namibia 71 20 9 17 28 56 
South Africa 22 69 9 17 45 38 
Tanzania 92 8 0 3 11 86 
Uganda 4 94 2 6 46 34 
Zambia 12 41 41 4 35 29 
Sources: African Legislatures Project 
Analysis  
As stated in the introduction, although the focus of this study is on the institution rather than the 
individual (macro) opinions of MP’s, provide an interesting and useful indication of the activity and 
progress within the legislatures. When read together, the two tables (Table 1 and Table 2 pages 25 and 
26) provide an interesting insight into the legislative dynamics. Considering the impact of individual 
MP’s on the overall functioning and efficiency of a parliament, the opinions of those MP’s who serve 
in the parliament in any given time may provide a deeper understanding of the overall law making 
activity at the time.138 Although opinions of MP’s do not speak to issues of actual independence of the 
legislature, they speak to perceptions which act as indicators of structural realities and potential areas 
of weakness or strength within a legislature, these considerations are important when evaluating the 
activity and capacity of individual legislatures around any given issue. 
 
Kenya appears to have the highest law making activity within the case selection, particularly with 
regard to the number of bills that have been referred to the health committee or relevant HIV & AIDS 
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committee. This second variable, although important, is a crude estimation as we do not know the 
content of the referred bills. The high activity within the Health Committee could indicate increased 
action around HIV & AIDS. However, without an in-depth study of the content of such bills there is 
no way to say for certain.  
 
The Kenyan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill was initially introduced in 2004. It was defeated 
after its first reading, but later reintroduced and finally passed in 2006. It is intriguing that there is 
only one bill explicitly mentioning HIV & AIDS, and this same bill took two years to be passed.139 
From a law making perspective, this suggests that the legislature is active around HIV, and not simply 
a rubber stamp parliament. Work by Barkan140 would confirm and highlight that Kenya’s parliament 
is functioning, and that it shows evidence of independence from the executive. Therefore, it appears 
that there is relatively high law making activity across these three variables, within Kenya during the 
timeframe of this study. 
 
No country review of the National HIV policy had occurred within the time frame of this study as the 
National Strategic plan was due to conclude in 2010. However, more recent information confirms that 
such a review has now been done. According to the data in the above tables, Kenya still does not have 
a law that protects PLWHA and laws continue to exist that present obstacles to the protection of 
vulnerable sub-groups, compounded by the existence of actual laws criminalizing such sub-groups. 
Despite this, the majority of MP’s interviewed by the African Legislatures project note that 
parliament’s influence on the content of legislation is either ‘too little’ or ‘about right’. In addition to 
this 40.8% of the same MP’s believe that legislatures’ effectiveness in law-making has improved over 
the last five years. 141 In light of these MP opinions, there is an indication, that despite the existence of 
negative attributes within the Kenyan legislature, MP’s are aware of their important role, and 
increased activity and effectiveness are currently being pursued.  When read together the two tables 
suggest that there is a relatively high level of legislative activity and Kenya is moving towards a more 
positive ‘HIV & AIDS aware’ future. 
 
Both Malawi and Mozambique appear to have similar law-making activity according to Table 1, 
above . In Malawi in 2003, the Legislature passed The Multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS project authorization 
and ratification bill, and in 2007 The HIV/AIDS National Policy Bill.142 In Mozambique in 2008 The 
Defense of rights and fight against discrimination and stigmatization of holders of HIV/AIDS bill was 
passed. Both countries show relatively high activity around the review of the National HIV Policy, but 
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continue to have laws that present obstacles to the protection of vulnerable sub populations, with 
specific laws that criminalizes MSM. Although the above table (Table 1 page 25) suggests relatively 
high law making activity in both of these countries, qualitative information presented in the UNAIDS 
Country Reports and a report by National Democratic Institute (NDI) and SADC PF in 2004 paint a 
more mottled reality.143 
 
The Mozambican legislature is criticized for the limited role it has played in addressing HIV & AIDS 
in the country. It is stated that several pieces of legislation are required for an adequate approach to 
HIV & AIDS within the country. Mozambique’s predominantly rural and agrarian population 
undermines the efforts expounded in the legislation brought in to protect the rights of employees in 
the workplace.144 It was suggested by one of the participants in the NDI/SADC PF survey that the 
paucity of AIDS legislation can be attributed to limited information dissemination and access for 
MP’s.145  
 
Malawi’s UNAIDS country report acknowledges a slow initial response to HIV & AIDS, attributed to 
limited public discussion around sex and sexuality.146 However, it appears that more recently the 
Legislature is reviewing existing policies to ensure both national and international policy 
consistency.147  It is therefore noted that several relevant pieces of legislation have been introduced, 
and are currently operational. Although only two of these pieces of legislation explicitly mention HIV 
& AIDS in the title, all six pieces attempt to tackle pertinent HIV & AIDS issues: the National 
HIV/AIDS policy, National Policy on Orphans and other vulnerable children, National Youth Policy, 
National Early Childhood Development Policy, National Health Policy and several sectoral pieces of 
legislation governing HIV & AIDS in the workplace. Unfortunately it is noted that although Malawi 
has the appropriate legislation in place, implementation often suffers due to inadequate infrastructure 
and resources.148 As with Mozambique there remains no official recognition of IDU’s and MSM. This 
is evidenced by the recent homophobic activity in the past year within the country.149 
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MP opinions in response to the question, “Has parliamentary effectiveness over the past five years got 
worse, stayed the same or got better with regard to making laws?” is in line with the law making 
activity in the two countries. Although both countries appear to be performing identically in the 
quantitative data, the qualitative data, as provided by NDI and the country reports suggests a different 
picture. Malawi appears to be performing better, with more activity overall and more suitable 
legislation and policies being passed. 63.3% of Malawian MP’s believe the Parliamentary influence 
over the content of legislation to be ‘about right’, while 44% of Mozambican MP’s believe it to be too 
little. This suggests that there is an institutional awareness of the shortcomings within the 
Mozambican legislature and a desire to improve upon this. Legislative effectiveness in lawmaking, in 
the preceding five years is seen to be improving in both Malawi and Mozambique, therefore painting 
a more positive picture about the relative activities of both of these Legislatures.150 
 
Both South Africa and Tanzania show evidence of some law making activity. I  both countries bills 
have been introduced into the legislature. Although South Africa has not passed any bills explicitly 
mentioning HIV & AIDS, there appears to be higher levels of activity in the South African 
committee, with four bills being referred to the Committee. Within the Tanzanian legislature one bill 
has been introduced and passed: The HIV Prevention and Control Act.151 It is noted, however, that 
within the Tanzanian standing orders, committees are not t sked with dealing with bills, and therefore 
bills are not referred to the committee. Law making activity in Tanzania can therefore not be 
measured by the number of bills through the Health Committee.152 
 
In 2003, the South African Parliament introduced the Compulsory HIV testing for sexual offenders bill 
of 2003. This bill was defeated and no other bill, explicitly mentioning HIV & AIDS has been 
introduced since.153 The discussion of mainstreaming HIV & AIDS is relevant to the South African 
example since, although there appear to be no bills explicitly mentioning HIV & AIDS, the parliament 
has enacted legislation to address the rights of citizens’ access to health care and has been pursuing a 
multi-sectoral approach within the country since 1998, applying HIV & AIDS to existing legislation. 
This approach has been upheld as an example within the region.154 
 
Unfortunately, both Tanzania and South Africa have laws that present obstacles to the protection of 
vulnerable sub-populations. Tanzania continues to have laws that criminalize MSM and SW, while 
South Africa continues to criminalize SW and IDU. Opinions of Members of Parliament within 
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Tanzania are particularly interesting. When asked about parliamentary influence over the content of 
legislation, an overwhelming percentage answered that parliamentary influence was too much (91%) 
while in South Africa the majority believed that parliamentary influence was ‘about right’. These 
figures provide an insight into the powers, institutional perceptions and role of Members of 
Parliament in these two countries, and may have influence on the content of legislation and the 
number of bills that are passed. When asked the question concerning parliamentary effectiveness over 
the preceding five-year period, the majority of Tanzanian MP’s believed that it had improved, (86%) 
while the majority of South African MP’s believed it had stayed the same.155 
 
Bills explicitly mentioning HIV & AIDS in the title have not been introduced or passed in Namibia, 
Uganda or Zambia during the time period. There is some activity around the number of bills referred 
to each of the respective health committees in these countries, although in fairly low numbers (1, 1 
and 2 respectively). As with Tanzania, the Namibian legislature does not refer bills to the Committee 
as a mandatory process, therefore making such a value an inaccurate measurement.156 In addition to 
this, although no bills were referred to the Ugandan Committee on Health, the committee participated 
in discussions around the Penal Code Amendment, which included discussions on HIV & AIDS, 
therefore suggesting a measure of activity independent of the number of bills referred to the 
Committee. 
 
It appears that all three legislatures have adequate laws that prevent PLWHA from discrimination,157 
but unfortunately all three countries still have laws that criminalize vulnerable sub-populations. 
Within Namibia, despite the best legislative efforts, the failure comes in implementation.158 It appears 
that the Namibian legislature has initiated some successful policies to combat HIV & AIDS, including 
the Orphan Law and that governing protection from dismissal.159 The legislature also played a role in 
enacting legislation that ensured the manufacture of ARV’s and condoms within the country, thereby 
improving prevention and treatment interventions.160 Unfortunately the law remains silent on MSM 
and IDU and sex work remains illegal.161 Within Zambia further revision is required to address 
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legislation that deals with HIV & AIDS, the primary example being in the form of the Rape Law 
which still remains silent on HIV & AIDS.162 
 
As with Tanzania, the majority of Namibian MP’s believe that legislative influence over the content 
of legislation is too much.  The majority of Zambian and Ugandan MP’s believe that the influence is 
just right.  Within Namibia the majority of MP’s believe that legislative effectiveness has improved, 
while in Uganda and Zambia it has remained the same. These points can be validated through 
qualitative literature on the topic.163 
Discussion 
 
The above tables (Table 1 and Table 2 pages 25 and 26), and analysis provides an indication as to 
how each of these eight parliaments is functioning on the legislative variable. However, it is important 
to note that neither the quantitative data, nor the qualitative data alone provides sufficient information 
to assess legislative activity in the parliaments. Furthermore, differing power dynamics and 
institutional structures impact upon the legislative variable, with notable examples from the Namibian 
and Tanzanian legislature, neither of which provide for mandatory referral of bills to the respective 
Health Committees. Another issue that is worthwhile to note, is the issue of HIV & AIDS 
mainstreaming, South Africa’s Parliament is a key example of this because within the South African 
Parliament attempts to mainstream HIV into existing legislation have reduced the number of explicit 
HIV & AIDS bills being introduced and passed. This has, however, not undermined their overall 
performance and activity. 
 
It appears from the above analysis and tables that all the legislatures within the case selection appear 
to be active in some way around the law-making variable. However, as with the Zambian Legislature, 
additional review and revision need to occur to tackle HIV & AIDS. Many of the legislatures appear 
to be addressing the issue and yet many of them do not successfully implement legislation. The 
parliaments of Malawi and Mozambique appear to be performing consistently well, within the time 
frame of this study, according to the preset criteria. However, both South Africa and Tanzania appear 
to be taking the appropriate steps to address the epidemic. 
 
Legislative Engagement with Civil Society 
 
Traditionally the representative function is executed when members represent the views of their 
constituents within the House. However, for the purposes of this research these aggregate indices will 
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be measured by the frequency and degree to which civil society can engage, and in fact does engage, 
with the legislature around HIV & AIDS issues. Whether or not civil society organisations have a 
space in which they can contribute, influence and alter parliamentary activity will be measured 
through several sub-categories: civil society input into new bills,164 whether or not the Chair of the 
parliamentary committee meets with civil society,165 whether parliamentary meetings within the 
committee tasked with HIV & AIDS are held in camera or in the open,166 number of civil society 
presentations in the committee tasked with HIV & AIDS,167 percentage of MP’s who turn to either 
civil society or academics for research and information168 and finally the level of civil society 
involvement in the National Strategic plan.169 The data for this aggregate indices primarily comes 
from the African Legislatures project. 
 
Do civil society organizations have a space in which they can contribute, influence and alter 
legislation and parliamentary activity? As defined in Chapter 2, these aggregate indices measure the 
degree to which civil society engages with the legislature on a whole, but specifically around issues of 
HIV & AIDS.170 Civil society plays a critical role not only in the consolidation of democracy, but in 
the representation of the public at large and the contribution of worthwhile resources and capacity. 
Through civil society engagement, increased vertical representation is cultivated from a grass roots 
level.171 Although, this is not the traditional understanding of representation, limitations on data, and 
literature around civil society participation informed the operationalization of this function. 
Traditionally representation refers to a wide variety of activities, I have selected a more narrow 
interpretation to satisfy the focus of this study. 
 
Table 3 (page 34) below, captures civil society engagement across the eight legislatures. Due to data 
limitations, Malawi cannot be compared across all sub-categories of this aggregate score. It is also 
important to note how this table is divided: The first five columns are specific to the parliamentary 
Committee tasked with HIV & AIDS matters. The following three columns deal with civil society 
engagement in general, with regard to the legislature as a whole. 
 
Table 3 highlights the fact that, with the exception of Mozambique, all parliaments hold public 
meetings, have civil society presentations and utilize either external or internal research support. It is 
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also interesting to note that the majority of MP’s in all countries, except Malawi, utilize civil society 
for input.  In most of the countries in this study, a lesser percentage of MP’s use academics for input. 
Notably high percentages of MP usage of civil society input are recorded in Namibia, South Africa 
and Tanzania across both academic and civil society columns. 
 
The first column identifies whether there was any civil society input into bills that explicitly mention 
HIV & AIDS in the title. Due to the obvious limitations of this measure, this may not be a wholly 
accurate measure of civil society engagement; however, it does provide an indication as to the role 
civil society plays around issues of HIV & AIDS in the legislature. In Mozambique, South Africa and 
Tanzania there is civil society input into bills such as these. 
 
In column 2, ‘Chair or Parliamentary Committee meets with Civil Society’, activity was recorded 
along a scale (none, seldom, sometimes and frequently).172 Column 5 records research support; 
external research support classified as: members external to the institution are consulted, such as a 
hired consultant, local civil society organizations, academics/universities or ministries. Internal 
support is defined as research staff from parliament, clerk or other assigned to the committee and 
interns.173 Some countries recorded that they used both external and internal sources. Finally, column 
eight is an ordinal ranking, provided by the governments themselves around the level of civil society 
involvement in the National Strategic Plan. This information is captured in the Country National 
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no Sometimes open >10 both 58 38 4 
Malawi 
Yes          49 27 4 
Mozambique 
Yes Frequently closed 0 none 50 42 4 
Namibia 
  Sometimes open 2 times internal 84 86 3 
South Africa 
Yes Frequently open 
between 6 and 
10 
internal 88 72 3 
Tanzania 
Yes Sometimes open 
between 3 and 
5 
internal 75 49   
Uganda 
  Frequently open 
between 3 and 
5 
internal 54 34 5 
Zambia 
  No open 
between 6 and 
10 
both 55 43 4 
Sources: African Legislatures Project, bill tracker and committee worksheets and Country National Composite Policy Index, 2008, 
UNAIDS. 
Comment 
Out of the above case selection, Mozambique stands out due to the results recorded in columns three 
to seven. Mozambique is the only country which holds the parliamentary meetings in camera, hence 
there are no civil society presentations to the committee. It is also the only country that records that 
neither internal nor external research support is sought, and it scores the lowest percentages of MP’s 
who use either civil society organizations or academics for general input.  Overall this paints a 
particularly poor view of civil society engagement within the Mozambican legislature. This low level 
of civil society engagement is acknowledged in the UNAIDS country report, and the need for stronger 
civil society relationships and partnerships is noted.175 
 
South Africa, Tanzania and Namibia record notably high percentages of MPs are who to use both civil 
society organizations (CSOs) and Academics (broadly) for input into legislative affairs. The variation 
between 87% and 50% may suggest differences in the capacity or organization of the committee, or it 
may be an indicator of the level of country civil society networking and cohesion. More independent 
study is required to reach any further conclusions.176 Although this measure is not specific to the 
committee tasked with HIV & AIDS, it may provide an indication of overall civil society engagement. 
Further studies are needed to explore civil society engagement with the HIV & AIDS committee 
specifically, as several factors such as donor pressure or the strength of the in-country civil society 
around HIV & AIDS may impact on such engagement. Current data limitations prevent further 
exploration into the specific HIV & AIDS committee/civil society engagement. 
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Both Tanzania and South Africa introduced bills that explicitly mentioned HIV & AIDS, and both 
these bills had civil society input during the process. South Africa is being hailed as a country which 
is successfully implementing a multi-sectoral response to HIV & AIDS. Information suggesting high 
levels of civil society engagement confirm this claim.177 It is interesting, however, that within NCPI 
report both Namibia and South Africa only score a three on the CS involvement with the National 
Strategic Plan, as opposed to scoring five, like Uganda. Despite scoring relatively low in column 1 
(civil society input into bills) and column 3 (number of civil society presentations to the committee) 
Namibia’s Country Report notes claims that civil society has been involved at all levels of HIV & 
AIDS policy in Namibia, and although no budgetary allowances are made to foster civil society 
engagement, such interaction and engagement has increased in Namibia.178 This suggests relatively 
high activity on behalf of Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania around the variable of civil society 
engagement. 
 
With the exception of Malawi, Kenya: Uganda and Zambia show similar levels of activity to each 
other, in the sense that they all appear to be consistently performing around civil society engagement. 
The table above notes that each has unusual patterns of activity around civil society engagement 
within each of the legislatures. 
 
Kenya appears to be consistent in its civil society engagement, and scores the highest number of civil 
society presentations to the committee (more than 10 per year). In addition to this they score a four in 
the NCPI questionnaire and utilize both internal and external resources and input.  Although the 
percentages of MP’s who claim to use CSO’s and academics for input are not particularly high, both 
percentages suggest that ample usage of these two resources occurs in the Kenyan Legislature. 
Although this data may suggest an active legislature that has cultivated and continues to cultivate a 
good standard of civil society engagement around HIV &AIDS issues, the bill explicitly mentioning 
HIV & AIDS did not have any civil society input. This appears to be unusual in the context of the 
relatively high levels of civil society engagement.  
 
A similar picture can be painted of Uganda, where we note that the Chair frequently meets with civil 
society and that civil society presents to parliament between three and five times a year. In addition to 
this there appears to be consistent usage, albeit not particularly high, of CSOs and academics by 
MP’s. They have been allocated a five on the NCPI score, suggesting that there is sound Civil Society 
engagement around HIV & AIDS. This is interesting, as Uganda historically has suffered under strict 
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civil society regulations, and currently has an NGO bill that further limits civil society on a whole.179 
In light of such civil society restrictions some doubt is raised about the validity of the NCPI data. 
Although NCPI data originates from civil society representatives, validity may still be questioned. 
 
Similar to Uganda and Kenya, Zambia appears to perform well around this variable. There is evidence 
that MP’s use both civil society and academics for input, and that civil society makes presentations to 
the committee fairly often (6 – 10 times a year). The Zambian Legislature utilizes both internal and 
external sources for research and they maintain that meetings are held in the open.  However, the 
Chair does not engage with civil society as it is noted that he is a new politician who is unlikely to 
have a substantial political power network outside the legislature.180 
 
Malawi is limited due to data restrictions and therefore cannot be quantitatively analyzed accurately 
with this variable. Malawi’s limited data note that there is some general engagement by MP’s with 
civil society and academics, although the percentages in both are the lowest out of the case selection. 
The country has been allocated a four in the NCPI, survey suggesting some activity, although validity 
of this data is not determined in this paper. Although it appears that the levels of civil society 
engagement highlighted in the NCPI survey can be confirmed by qualitative data in the Country 
Report, the governmental origin of the country report may lter the report’s validity. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the Country Report notes full involvement and participation of civil society in the 
national strategic plans.181 
Conclusion 
Although there is some variation between the countries in this case selection, with the exception of 
Mozambique and Malawi, it appears that all countries are performing relatively well across this 
variable. Although some improvement could be sought on the individual case level, it appears that 
civil society engagement occurs in each of the eight legislatures and that each of these eight 
legislatures recognizes the important role civil society plays in the pursuit of a multi sectoral response 
to HIV & AIDS. 
Oversight Function 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the oversight function can be executed with regard to the monitoring of budget 
and holding the executive to account.182 Legislatures can play a key role in promoting health and 
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health equity through these functions.183 Oversight of the budget and ensuring that the government 
adheres to the promises it has made ensure horizontal accountability and transparency with regard to 
budget expenditure.184  Although, data is limited on parliamentary influence over the budget 
specifically related to HIV & AIDS, EQUINET’s study on Parliamentary roles around the monitoring 
and engagement with the executive and around the Abuja Commitment to health spend highlights the 
role Parliaments can play with regard to the health budget.185 Traditionally African parliaments 
struggle under neo-patrimonial executive-dominant systems, undermining their oversight capacities. 
However, it is asserted by Mattes et al., that more recently many African legislatures have seen a 
renewal of the oversight function. 186   
 
To measure this variable, there are two components: the budget and the committee. Oversight of the 
budget is important for accountability, particularly when faced with an epidemic that places such 
extreme financial burdens on the state.187 Whether or not there is an active and well-staffed 
committee, specifically created to address HIV & AIDS issues, or a committee tasked with HIV, may 
influence execution of oversight.188 It is important to note here, that the committees used to measure 
activity around this variable are not explicitly HIV/AIDS committees, but rather any committee that 
has been tasked with the HIV/AIDS agenda. 
 
Table 4 (page 39), below, collects data across several budgetary oversight functions. It is important to 
note that the first three columns deal with the parliaments in general, and are not focused on the 
Health or HIV & AIDS Committee. The final two columns are specific to the health committees in 
each country. Data has been collected from two different data sets, EQUINET and the African 
Legislatures project; however there are limits to the data on a whole. 
 
The first two columns note the percentage of MP’s who responded either ‘about right’ or ‘improved’ 
respectively to the two questions, across the eight-country case selection. MP’s were asked: 1. “Does 
the parliament have too much, about the right amount or too little influence over the budget?”  2. “Has 
parliamentary effectiveness over the past five years worsened, stayed the same or improved with 
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regard Monitoring Executive?” Both questions speak to one aspect of oversight, that of the budget. 
Monitoring what the executive spends is an important parliamentary role, as it plays out one of the 
constitutional democratic checks and balances, ‘legislative oversight is nowhere more important than 
over the budget’189. It is important to note here that these questions were asked of parliament as a 
whole, not the individual committees, or committees tasked with HIV & AIDS. Therefore, as with the 
Civil Society engagement and the legislative questions, these figures provide only an indication as to 
how parliament as a whole is functioning around these variables and the relative comparative activity. 
Although these data does not specifically relate to the HIV committee, and while the focus of this 
study is on the role of the institution, rather than the individual, these opinions provide a small insight 
into potential strengthening of the legislative institution. Traditionally the execution of the oversight 
variable in many African parliaments, is not particularly strong, with improved parliamentary 
strengthening initiatives, and increased HIV/AIDS focus, it is both interesting and important to note 
any changes around the oversight function. 
 
The third column refers to the governmental allocation towards the health budget. In terms of the 
Abuja Declaration each country should allocate 15% of their entire budget towards health. These data 
track the country’s adherence to this commitment. This column, when read together with the MP 
opinion data and the activity within the Committees around Health and HIV, provides an interesting 
insight into the parliamentary oversight of the budget, specifically relating to health. Although this 
budgetary commitment is broadly allocated to health, and not specifically HIV & AIDS, further 
examination of the individual committee priorities suggests the relative importance placed on HIV & 
AIDS within the countries.190 
 
The final two columns are health committee- specific. They identify the priorities within the 
committees and the questions from the committees directed at the Executive.191 Although these are 
both snapshot pieces of data, they both fall within the time frame of this study and are an interesting 
indication of budget and oversight activities within the committees. Parliamentarians, specifically 
those within the committees, can assist in the effective use of the oversight function through 
scrutinizing how funds are spent, the reasons behind under-spending and increasing the amount 
allocated to HIV & AIDS.192 
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Although the data presented in Table 4 (page 39) below, is far from comprehensive, when both 
specific Health Committee data and general parliamentary data are read together, they provide a base 
level understanding of oversight within each of the eight legislatures. As noted, it is critical to gain 
insight into budgetary allocation as a country’s budget is a sound indicator of the priority afforded to 
the HIV & AIDS epidemic - a more telling indicator perhaps than legislative activity or civil society 
engagement.  In addition to this, tracking changes of perception and practical application of oversight 
powers provides a useful indication as to the success of HIV/AIDS and legislative strengthening 
initiatives.  Furthermore, government initiatives require funding to sustain them, therefore the national 
budget often proves to be the key resource in project sustainability.193  
 
To supplement Table 4 (page 39), belowadditional information collected by EQUINET through 
questionnaires given to Health Committees within Eastern and Southern Africa helps to provide a 
stronger understanding of legislative oversight.194 Conclusions drawn from this data note that 
legislative budgetary influence over health equity issues are potentially significant and require 
additional assistance and support.195 
                                                 
193 Guthrie, T and Hickey, A. 2004. Funding the fight: budgeting for HIV/AIDS in developing countries. IDASA, AIDS 
Budget Unit. Cape Town, South Africa. At 2. 
194 Loewenson R,  London L, Thomas J, Mbombo N, Mulumba M, Kadungure A, Manga N, Mukono A.2009. Experiences 
of Parliamentary Committees on Health in promoting health equity in East and Southern Africa ’ EQUINET Discussion 
Paper Series 73.UCT, TARSC, SEAPACOH: EQUINET, Harare. At 3. 




















Does the parliament 
have too much, 
about the right 
amount or too little 
influence over the 
budget -percentage 
of MP’s who believe 
it is about right (%) 
 
Has parliamentary 
effectiveness over the 
past 5 years got worse, 
stayed the same or got 
better with regard 
Monitoring Executive 
Expenditure– 
percentage of MP’s who 





allocated to health 
2003 -2006 (5) 
Committee budget 
priorities 
Content of questions raised 
with executive196 
Kenya 75 35 6 increased budget 
allocation and the priority 
of health needs (personnel, 
commodities, facilities) 
Poor budget allocation 
Malawi 27 53 11 improved drug supplies 
including ARV's 
Service level agreements 
between government and 
NGOS and mission hospitals 
Mozambique 12 60    
Namibia 49 50 14 ARV and testing supplies Questions on health issues 
raised by opposition MP's 
South Africa 47 33 11   
Tanzania 50 89  Maternal health None/Not answered 
Uganda 86 24 12 Maternal and rural health, 
family planning, 
reproductive and health 
and primary care 
Increased funding of 
Maternal Health, 
Reproductive Health and 
family planning 
Zambia 33 31 17 increased funding to health 
care to improve service 
provision 
Incentives to attract back 
health personnel from 
abroad. 
Sources: African Legislatures Project and EQUINET 
Analysis 
According to Table 4 (page 39),above, it appears that Kenya is not meeting the Abuja commitments, 
as only 6% of government funds have been allocated to health, 1994 – 2006.197 However, poor budget 
allocation is acknowledged both in the questions directed towards the executive and in the priorities 
within the committee itself. Therefore it appears that although the Kenyan parliament has not 
sufficiently allocated government resources to health, the committee acknowledges this shortcoming, 
and should be working to reach the target as set out in the Declaration. 
 
This relative lack of influence has been highlighted in other literature and it has been asserted that the 
parliament does not to have much influence over the budget. In Kenya the Minister of Finance 
prepares the budget, including the estimated expenditure on HIV & AIDS. This is then transferred to 
the parliament for approval, as in most countries.198 However, although there is a legal framework for 
fiscal management by the government, there appears to be no corresponding role for parliament, due 
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to a constitutional restriction on parliament acting on financial laws.199 Furthermore, information 
collected by EQUINET notes that MP’s within Kenya felt that they did not have enough influence 
over the budget.200 
 
What is unusual is that the majority of MP’s within Kenya appear to believe that the parliamentary 
influence over the budget is ‘about right’ and the monitoring of the executive expenditure has 
improved (35%) in the past five years. In addition to this, the majority of MP’s (58.3%) believe that 
political independence from the executive and oversight of the executive is ‘about right.201 The MP 
opinions are, however, taken from the MP’s in general, not specifically the Health Committee, which 
may suggest relative government neglect of health issues, as budget allocation is a health issue. It 
could be concluded from the above table that additional work needs to be done around HIV and 
Health. It is clear from the questions that within the Health Committee itself, HIV is not a priority, 
although indirectly the issues raised will speak to the issue of HIV & AIDS. The comparison between 
the two sets of data speaking to budgetary oversight provides an indication for further legislative 
strengthening and HIV/AIDS interventions; although the MP’s believe that oversight of the budget is 
about right, and while they also appear to consider the oversight to have declined in the past 5 years, 
commitments made to international agreements continue not to be met. This  potentially suggests that 
additional work around oversight initatives should be done to better inform and mobilize MP’s around 
these issues. 
 
Although Mozambique’s data is incomplete, a very small number of MP’s in both Malawi and 
Mozambique believe influence on the budget is ‘about right’.  However, in both countries the majority 
of MP’s believe that monitoring executive expenditure has improved in the last five years. It is 
interesting to note, therefore, that again in both these counties MP’s believe that political 
independence202 is ‘too little’203.  In the case of Mozambique, the EQUINET data confirms that indeed 
MP’s feel that they cannot exert parliamentary influence over the budget. However, in Malawi the 
opposite is true.204It is intriguing to note that both Malawi and Mozambique perform in similar ways 
on both the legislative and budget oversight variables. 
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Malawi (1994 – 2006) is close to meeting the Abuja target, (11%) and the issues raised within the 
committee clearly prioritize HIV & AIDS. The questions directed towards the executive broadly 
address health in the country, as opposed to specific HIV & AIDS issues. This data suggests positive 
activity within the Malawian parliament around budget oversight, and HIV & AIDS. 
 
Qualitative data highlights that the Mozambican legislature does not play an important role in the 
budget process, and that the legislative organ requires more attention to build suitable capacities 
around budget analysis.205 In addition to this further studies assert that although HIV & AIDS has 
been declared one of Mozambique’s top priorities, this is not reflected in the allocation of financial 
resources to the issue.206 
 
Namibia is close to meeting the Abuja targets (14%) and there appears to be a prioritizing of HIV & 
AIDS within the Committee, which could suggest allocation of funds towards HIV & AIDS issues.207 
Unfortunately, when it comes to asking questions of the executive, questions are asked only by the 
opposition members, and these questions go unanswered. The general MP opinion is divided between 
the answers ‘too little’ and ‘about right’ (49%) when asked about parliamentary influence over the 
budget. This could indicate an ideological split between different parties, confirmed by the questions 
directed at the Executive. This result is interesting in the Namibian case, as at any given time, the 
number of MP’s who are Ministers and also Deputy Ministers is very high.208 Therefore it is 
surprising that these same MP’s would conclude that the parliament needs more budgetary powers. 
Finally, Namibian MP’s claim that parliamentary monitoring of executive expenditure has improved 
over the past five years. The EQUINET survey concludes that within Namibia that MP’s feel that they 
do have influence over the budget.209 With regard to perceptions of oversight and political 
independence from the executive, the majority of Namibian MP’s believe both are ‘too little’.210 
 
Both South Africa and Tanzania are missing data in Table 4 (page 39). Within Tanzania the MP 
opinion over parliamentary influence over the budget is divided between ‘about right’ (50%) and ‘too 
little’, again suggesting a potential party split. However, there is clearly a belief that executive 
monitoring has improved. This data alone, potentially suggests that there is some positive activity 
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within Tanzania, however, there appear to be no questions asked of the Executive by the Committee, 
and HIV & AIDS has not been prioritized within the Committee as only maternal health has been 
raised. This does not suggest an overall positive picture about Tanzanian parliamentary activity 
around budget oversight. An MP evaluation of political independence from the executive, and 
oversight both render the majority result of ‘about right’211 
 
Within South Africa 11% of the budget has been allocated towards health, highlighting progress 
within the country. MP’s within South Africa believe parliamentary influence to be ‘about right’ and 
that parliamentary monitoring of executive expenditure has remained the same over the preceding 
five-year period. When asked to evaluate oversight, and political independence from the executive, 
the majority of MP’s believed that influence to be ‘too little.’212 South Africa, however, presents an 
interesting case study: the percentages of MP’s who feel that the influence is ‘about right’ are very 
similar to those MP’s who believe that there is too much influence/too little influence over the budget. 
This may speak to the ideological divisions between the parties within South Africa.  
 
However, the unusual and precarious situation of the South African parliament with regard to its 
budgetary powers, would suggest that more MP’s would fall into the ‘too little’ category. Under S 77 
of the Constitution of South Africa the parliament is afforded powers to amend money bills; however, 
no legislation has been passed that allows the parliament to execute this power, therefore leaving the 
extent of the powers is under debate.213 Furthermore, the parliament’s budgetary process has been 
described as ‘moderately transparent’, primarily due to the limited role played by parliament. It is 
therefore surprising that more MP’s are not objecting to the apparently limited role of the parliament 
with regard to these matters.214 
 
Uganda appears to be allocating more to health than South Africa, and appears to be exercising 
oversight around the budget, and health, although not specifically around HIV & AIDS. It is 
interesting to note this variation in health expenditure and oversight capacity, due to Uganda’s history 
of strong executive leadership around HIV & AIDS. MP’s within Uganda believe that parliamentary 
influence over the budget, oversight and independence from the executive215 is ‘about right’ while 
only 24% believe executive monitoring has improved. Although Uganda appears to be making 
headway around the Abuja commitments, there does not appear to be much oversight exercised over 
the budget. This may be due to limited information or institutional structures. 
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Zambia not only appears to be meeting the Abuja targets but surpassing them. However, the 
committees do not appear to prioritize HIV & AIDS, as neither the issues raised within the Health 
Committee nor those directed towards the Executive have an HIV & AIDS component. Although 
there is no specific focus on HIV & AIDS, the issued raised in the questions directed at the Executive 
indirectly speak to HIV issues and therefore suggest the mainstreaming agenda. The majority of 
Zambian MP’s believe that parliamentary influence is ‘about right’ and that executive monitoring has 
improved over the past five years. However, when asked about political independence, and the quality 
of oversight, the majority of MP’s believed it was ‘too little’.216 
Conclusions 
 
There does appear to be some activity around budget oversight within each of the eight cases. Malawi 
and Namibia appear to prioritize HIV & AIDS directly while issues relating to HIV & AIDS are 
addressed more indirectly in Uganda, Zambia and Kenya as they are mainstreamed into more general 
concerns relating to health and development.  
 
From this examination, it appears that Kenya’s parliamentarians need additional support in budgetary 
oversight, and that Malawi is performing well. These conclusions potentially would change with the 




Unlike Table 4 (page 39) above, tTable 5 (page 44) relates specifically to parliamentary committees 
that are tasked with HIV & AIDS.  Due to the magnitude of the epidemic, each parliament should 
have a specific HIV/AIDS committee.217 It should be noted that while all parliaments in this study 
have committees tasked with HIV & AIDS, only a few have specific HIV & AIDS committees.218 
Arguably, whether or not such a committee exists should be a valid indicator of how highly HIV & 
AIDS is prioritized and, presumably, the level of parliamentary activity on the issue. Clearly, an 
active committee that is equipped with sufficient expertise and funds to execute its parliamentary 
mandate should result in more effective oversight.219 
 
It appears that all committees have sufficient funding for regular meetings, as well as for travel and 
hearings. Further, each of the seven committees has a portion of members who have technical and 
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professional expertise. All except Uganda and Zambia have a Chairperson with parliamentary 
expertise. Finally, the majority of committees meet regularly and all committees produced a 
committee report on the proceedings of the committee at the end of the year for which data was 
obtained.  On the basis of this data we can conclude that all seven countries have a committee with 
sufficient resources to perform its oversight functions.  
Table 5: General Oversight 
 
Oversight via 
Committee                       
  

















































Kenya No <quarterly seldom Yes Yes Yes Yes Some 2 Yes Yes 
Malawi No                     
Mozambique Yes regular seldom Yes Yes No Yes Many 1 Yes Yes 
Namibia No 
more than 
quarterly No Yes Yes No Yes Some 0 Yes Yes 
South Africa No regular No Yes Yes Yes Yes Many 0 Yes Yes 
Tanzania Yes 
 more than 
quarterly No Yes Yes No Yes Many 0 Yes no 
Uganda Yes Not regularly frequently Yes Yes No No Many 3 Yes Yes 
Zambia Yes regular No Yes Yes No No some 0 Yes Yes 
Sources: African Legislatures Project 
Analysis 
 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia all have a committee that is dedicated to issues directly 
relating to HIV & AIDS. South Africa is in the process of creating such a committee, which is 
planned to be functioning later in 2011.220Although South Africa’s committee does not fit within the 
time frame, it is worthwhile noting the progressive positive steps that are being taken in the different 
African legislatures.221 
 
In relation to funding, the committee in Uganda faces particular challenges.222 Unlike committees in 
Zambia and South Africa, the Chair of the committee in Uganda frequently has to solicit for funds as 
the funding received from the Parliamentary commission is insufficient to cater for the needs of the 
committee.223 For lack of funds – the committee receives less than half of its budgeted funds224 – it is 
unable to hold regular meetings and to undertake necessary travels around the country. Although less 
                                                 
220 Establishment of Joint Committee on HIV/AIDS. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. Annexure 2. Available 
online: http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/index.php 
221 Ibid. 

















frequently than in Uganda, the Chair of the committee in Tanzania also needs to seek external funds 
from donors and NGOs.225 When such funding is not forthcoming, the committee in Tanzania is 
restricted in its ability to travel across the country.226 
 
Despite apparent resource restrictions the committee in Uganda managed to execute three special 
investigations, more than any other committee analyzed here.227 The committee led investigations into 
allegations about the production of substandard generic ARV drugs by a Ugandan pharmaceutical 
company, into the shortage of ARV’s at health facilities (often called ‘stock outs’) and into the 
existence of substandard condoms on the market.228 In Mozambique a special investigation was made 
into a private company which ordered all employees to undergo HIV testing without informed 
consent.229 Both of these examples highlight the significant role HIV & AIDS specific committees can 
play.  
In Kenya, Malawi and Namibia, issues relating to HIV & AIDS are handled by committees with a 
broader mandate: the Committee on Health in Kenya, the Health and Population Committee in 
Malawi230 and subcommittee on Human Resources, Social and Community development in 
Namibia.231  
 
In both Kenya and Namibia, these committees meet regularly and have some members with technical 
expertise specific to HIV & AIDS. They both have adequate funds to support travel, public hearings 
and meetings. As in Uganda, the Chair of the committee in Kenya may solicit additional funding, but 
in Kenya such additional funding is only necessary for particular activities that lie outside of the core 
activities for which parliament provides funding.232 In Namibia, independent soliciting of funding by 
the Committee is not permitted.233 
Conclusions 
 
The HIV & AIDS specific parliamentary committee in Uganda has performed particularly well on this 
function considering the number of special investigations it has executed. With the exception of 
Uganda, the data provided in the above tables do not suggest that parliaments with HIV & AIDS 
specific committees are more active or better resourced. There are fairly high levels of activity across 
the majority of countries in all committees tasked with HIV & AIDS. It is difficult to establish what 
priority is being given to HIV & AIDS issues in Namibia and Kenya on the oversight function since 
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the committees have a broader responsibility. Additional analyses presented further below will 
provide a stronger basis for making an assessment in this regard. 
 
Constituency Service Function 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2 ‘constituency service’ refers to the extent to which Members of 
Parliament perform certain functions and activities within their respective constituencies. 234  The 
nature of these functions can vary, but normally they would involve personal visits, responding to 
demands from individual members of the constituency and the involvement in small- to medium-scale 
development projects.235 For the purposes of this research, the level of constituency service will be 
measured by three factors: the amount of money spent by a member of parliament in the constituency 
in a given year to meet personal or project needs, the frequency of the visits, and; the length of stay in 
the constituency.236 Previous analyses have noted that the performance by African legislature in 
general in terms of constituency service have improved more recently.237 Although this function does 
not explicitly measure HIV/AIDS activity, consideration and inclusion of this function may suggest 
an interesting link between the AIDS pandemic and activity levels by MP’s at their constituencies. 
Activity of MP’s may be altered or influenced by the severity of the pandemic, impacting upon their 
time spent in parliament, the amount of money they spend and the duration of their stay in their 
constituencies.  Although there is no direct link between the pandemic and MP constituency service, 
and this study does not prove that such a link exists, it is an interesting approach requiring additional 
research to corroborate. This point is emphasized in the EQUINET study.238 
Comment 
 
Table 6 (page 47), belowdetails the various factors used to assess the level of constituency work: the 
percentage of time; the number of trips; the length of stay both in an out of session, and the amount of 
money spent by MPs in their constituencies. The interpretation of the data must take the following 
limitations into account. There are no financial data available for Zambia, and due to the nature of the 
questions in the original survey the time period referred to in the Zambia and Uganda surveys is a 
year whereas in the other it was a month. This fault therefore upsets the data, limiting the comparisons 
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that can be made within the case selection.  Both means and medians have been calculated with regard 
to expenditures, to assist with accuracy. 














In session, length 
of stay in 
Constituency: 
Country Mean 
Out of Session, 



























41 3 3 4 5 $740 $658 $864 $659 
Malawi 
46 7 6 14 12 $699 $666 $346 $200  
Mozambique 
20 2 3 3 27 $244 $209 $45 $0.00 
Namibia 
16 1 3 3 11 $129 $87 $178 $73 
South Africa 
30 7 4 6 14 $216 $316 $145 $122 
Tanzania 
36 1 2 1 25 $545 $33 $492 $64. 
Uganda 






2 6 39 6 51 no data no data no data no data 
Sources: African Legislatures Project 
Analysis 
 
Malawi and Kenya register the highest percentage of time devoted to constituency work, with 46 and 
41 percent respectively, followed by Tanzania and South Africa at 36 and 31 percent. Although it 
must be noted that different electoral systems result in different levels of constituency service, it is 
intriguing to note that MPs in two of Africa’s wealthiest parliaments (Kenya and South Africa) are 
recording the highest percentage of time devoted to constituency work. 
 
Members of Parliament in Malawi record the highest number of trips to the constituency and they also 
spend the longest time there. South African MP’s also appear to spend a fair amount of time and 
frequently travel to their constituencies, when compared with other cases in this selection. As would 
be expected, the length of stay increases considerably when the parliament is out of session across all 
the countries, since MPs then have no duties at Parliament. MPs in Malawi and Kenya spend most 
resources in their constituencies, followed by MPs in South Africa. While this should come as no 
surprise in terms of Kenya and South Africa, as those parliaments are relatively wealthy, the fact that 
spending is high in Malawi is more interesting. Only 4 percent of Malawian MPs are satisfied with the 
allowances allocated to constituency work, and none of the MPs in the survey are satisfied with 
allowances allocated to constituency offices.239 Malawi’s relatively low wealth can be noted in the 
GNI per capita index as produced by the World Bank, see Table 8 in Chapter 4 below. 
 
                                                 















In Kenya an overwhelming majority of MP’s are satisfied with their allowances allocated to 
constituency work and the constituency offices, while in South Africa only 34.4% and 12.5% are 
happy, respectively.240  It appears that within Tanzania few visits are made to constituencies by MPs, 
and all are short in duration, while parliament is in session. The information on personal financial 
donations is particularly interesting for Tanzania. In terms of the mean value the contributions are the 
third highest. However, the fact that the mean is more than 16 times the median value suggests great 
variation in contributions by MPs in Tanzania. Relatively few of the MPs make considerable 
donations and most of them donate much less; in terms of the median value, MPs in Tanzania spend 
the least of MPs in all parliaments for which there is comparable data. Only 28% of MPs in Tanzania 
are happy with the funds allocated to constituency work and even fewer of them are satisfied with the 
funds allocated to constituency offices.241 
 
Namibia consistently records very low levels of constituency work, both i  terms of time and 
financial contributions, which could be attributed to its electoral system.  Mozambique and Uganda 
devote similar amounts of time to constituency service. It is interesting to note that Mozambique’s 
personal donations are higher than those of South Africa, considering the relative wealth of the 
parliaments in comparison, and due to the fact that both countries share the same electoral system. 
This variation could possibly indicate that there is a greater need for expenditure within Mozambique, 
which, with additional research could be attributed to HIV & AIDS.  However, Mozambique’s project 
donation means are the lowest in the case selection, this could be an indication of overall national 
wealth (and therefore resources available to parliament) or attributed to electoral system. Considering 
the current crisis experienced in Mozambique related to HIV & AIDS it is particularly interesting to 
consider the role of constituency work in the fight against HIV & AIDS. Qualitative information 
contradicts the data on Mozambique’s constituency service, as it is claimed that much work was done 
on the ground by individual MP’s around HIV & AIDS within Mozambique, and rather a bottom up 
as opposed to a top down approach was fostered.242 
 
Within Namibia the country means and medians differ significantly, suggesting that the majority of 
MP’s spend less than the country mean on both project donation and personal donation.  
 
As mentioned in Table 6 (p 47) above, the data for Uganda and Zambia are problematic due to the 
difference in time-frames in the original survey. The information is thus not comparable. This is of 
course very unfortunate as Uganda and Zambia present interesting anomalies across the other 
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variables. In Uganda, as many as 86 percent of MPs were satisfied  with allowances for constituency 
work but none of the MPs in the survey were satisfied with the funds allocated to constituency offices. 
In Zambia only 15 percent of MPs were satisfied with allowances for constituency work and only 8 
percent with funds allocated to constituency offices.243 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the stated limitations, these data nevertheless provide new and interesting insights into the 
level of resources that are spent within the eight parliaments in terms of time and money. While 
further analyses will be done on these findings in the subsequent chapter, it is clear that MPs in Kenya 
and Mozambique perform particularly well on the constituency service function, both in terms of time 







To further assist in the creation of a comparable, cross-national data set, a scorecard of legislative 
activity has been created. It must, however, be noted that this scorecard, weights the individual 
subcategories and allocates a score to each based on the perceived impact it will have on the HIV & 
AIDS response. Therefore some of these composite scores represent a normative value, and are not 
reflective of actual legislative activity.  
 
Each of the four aggregate indices has been grouped under five composite score headings:  
Progressive law-making activity, legislative engagement with civil society, oversight of the budget, 
oversight generally and constituency service. For the purposes of this score card, oversight of the 
budget has been divided into an independent composite score.  Each of the scores has been calculated, 
with consideration to missing data, and has been recorded as a percentage of the maximum 
performance around each function. An average score is allocated, which is simply calculated upon the 
subcomponents, and not on the composite score. A detailed explanation of the methodology is 
included in Appendix 6 of this paper.  
 
Although this scorecard does not capture the nuances of the data around legislative performance, it 
provides a sound indication of overall activity, allowing us to note the variations. It is sufficient to 
                                                 















note positive activity and award it with a positive numeral, while activity that is detrimental to the 




































      Budget General     
Kenya 18 84 33 76 49 52 
Malawi 64 NA 56 NA 66 62 
Mozambique 45 53 11 71 52 46 
Namibia 9 74 67 65 29 49 
South Africa 27 89 22 71 49 52 
Tanzania 18 63 11 59 46 39 
Uganda 0 79 33 71 N/A 46 
Zambia 18 68 67 59 N/A 53 




A simple correlation analysis run on both the function scores and the overall composite score 
highlights an interesting relationship between constituency service and law-making activity. There is a 
strong positive correlation, which is statistically significant, suggesting that within these eight 
countries, legislatures that perform well on law-making also perform well on constituency service. 
Table 8 shows the correlation between the law–making activity and constituency service. This 
correlation, although statistically significant is limited due to the small case selection. Although 
correlations analyses were run on all of the variables, the relationship highlighted in Table 8, below, 
was the only one statistically relevant. 























Barkan notes that within all legislatures there is an institutional tension between the various legislative 
functions.244 Legislatures that perform well on the oversight and legislative functions do not perform 
well on the representative and constituency service functions. This tension is inherent in all 
legislatures irrespective of socio-political context or external influences. However, the strong positive 
relationship highlighted above suggests that within these eight legislatures, the legislatures that have 
high law-making activity around HIV & AIDS also perform well around constituency service. This 
contradicts Barkan’s work and may suggest that traditional legislative functioning is different when 
dealing with the issue of HIV & AIDS. 





While it is certainly true, as noted by Strand, that ‘AIDS is too complex a problem for any clever 
governance quick fix’245 it is nevertheless worthwhile to capture data on actual performance by key 
governance institutions that share responsibility for the AIDS response. This chapter has identified 
and detailed levels of activity across four key functions; law-making, legislative engagement with 
civil society, oversight and constituency service.  Each of the different countries records different 
levels of activity across the different variables, which although limited, may provide a useful insight 
into the role of governance with regard to HIV & AIDS within ESA. This unique systematic approach 
is the first to cover all four of these functions of legislative activity and present it in a way that 
promotes cross national comparisons.  Although it is difficult to accurately evaluate the performance 
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of each country, based on limited data and only with quantitative data these difficulties are noted and 























































Explaining variations in legislative activity 
 
The previous chapter identified the variation in parliamentary performance on HIV/AIDS by ‘scoring’ 
actual activity on four key functions. This chapter will present explorative statistical analyses of what 
factors may explain the differences in performance between the eight parliaments. At this stage it is 
worth re-emphasizing a point made in the discussion on research methodology in chapter two above. 
Statistical tests of causality require multivariate regression analyses. However, that technique is not 
appropriate here due to the few cases in this analysis (N=8). The following statistical tests are 
therefore meant to identify any general tendencies that might appear when variables on parliamentary 
performance are correlated with variables that capture arguments in the literature on what factors 
might contribute to the explanation of levels of parliamentary performance on HIV/AIDS. These 
tendencies cannot be generalized but are restricted to the parliaments in the eight countries that are 
included in the analysis. Although correlations were run for each of the explanatory variables, against 
each of the legislative functions, the scatterplots included and displayed in this chapter are the only 
ones that showed an interesting correlation or relationship between the variables. 
Explanatory variables 
The table below records data on eight variables that are plausible explanations for the variation in 
parliamentary performance; HIV/AIDS prevalence, the number of years the National AIDS Council 
has been in place, GNI per capita, the quality of political governance more generally, the electoral 
system, whether the country has a parliamentary or a presidential political system and the nature of 
public opinion of the Government’s performance on HIV/AIDS. Each of these explanatory variables 
is drawn from an established argument or hypothesis in the literature. However, this list of plausible 
explanations is not exhaustive. The quality of leadership from the Executive is emphasized in the 
literature, but since no data was available on this variable it will be discussed only in a more 
qualitative fashion below.  Although there may be some merit in discussing legislative leadership, as 

















































Prioritize AIDS  












ALP ALP Afrobarometer Afrobarometer 
Kenya 8 2000 1560 33 FPTP Presidential 21  4.5 
Malawi 11 2000 760 45 FPTP Presidential 24.9  1.0 
Mozambique 13 2001 790 45 PR Presidential 36.8  6.3 
Namibia 15 1999 6370 78 PR Presidential 27.7  23.2 
South Africa 18 1999 10140 77 PR Parliamentary 40.5  23.9 
Tanzania 6 2001 1300 48 FPTP Presidential 13 3.3  
Uganda  5 1992 1140 48 FPTP Presidential 13.4  6.0 
Zambia 15 2002 1240 47 FPTP Presidential 22.3  5.6 
Sources: African Legislatures Project, University of Cape Town, UNAIDS, Afrobarometer, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, World Bank and 
National AIDS councils 
1.  HIV prevalence 
On this variable, the expectation is that higher HIV prevalence in the adult population is linked to 
higher parliamentary activity. The reason for this would be that the need for parliamentary responses 
to increase with higher prevalence, both in terms of the legislature showing leadership by taking 
initiatives in law-making and oversight, as well as in terms of the legislature and individual MPs 
responding to a demand for services in society and their constituencies respectively. This reasoning 
seems to underpin the work by IDASA.246  
The analysis, however, provide only vague and qualified support for the hypothesis, with all 
coefficients being quite weak and two being negative. 
 
Table A: Pearson Correlation on Adult (15 – 49) HIV Prevalence 
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Adult (15 -49) HIV 
Prevalence 
.263 .140 .377 -.091 -.187 .452 
N 8 7 8 7 6 8 
 
Impact from HIV prevalence on Law Making Activity 
Although the positive relationship (Pearson’s r .263) between law-making and HIV prevalence 
supports the hypothesis, it is not a strong tendency in the data. The scatterplot below is in this 
instance more interesting as a visual guide to support analytical narratives about individual 
countries. For instance, South Africa’s poor score on law-making, despite having the most severe 
epidemic, reflects the AIDS denialism that dominated under the Thabo Mbeki presidency. 247 
However, it is also interesting to note the low position of Namibia, a country regarded as relatively 
wealthy with the same electoral system as South Africa. According to Nattrass; Namibia performs 
better than expected on Leadership of HIV/AIDS, while South Africa’s leadership is poor, while their 
legislative performance remains stronger than Namibia’s. 248  Further research into the 
independence of the Namibian legislature may provide further clarification on this topic. It is 
interesting to note the position of both Malawi and Mozambique: both perform well on law making, 
despite having a lower prevalence. If only the five countries with the highest HIV prevalence had 
been included, the analysis would have generated a strong and negative correlation that would have 
falsified the hypothesis. The case of Uganda determines much of the tendency in the data. With the 
lowest HIV prevalence and no progressive law-making activity during the period of the study, 
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Budget Oversight and HIV Prevalence 
There is a slightly stronger positive relationship between budget oversight and HIV Prevalence .377 
(Pearson’s r).  This relationship supports the hypothesis that increased prevalence will result in 
improved legislative performance. However, a scatterplot of this relationship did not provide any 
further visual clarification. Legislatures play an important role with regard to the budget and 
particularly promoting the Abuja Commitment. It follows that countries with a higher prevalence 
would exercise more legislative oversight over the budget, to ensure that more money is allocated 
towards health generally and HIV/AIDS. This relationship is highlighted and explored by EQUINET 
in their paper – where they note that although most countries remain below the target allocation, there 
has been an improvement in the exercising of the oversight of the budget.250 
 
Overall Legislative Composite Score and HIV Prevalence 
The hypothesis that higher prevalence would result in higher legislative performance is tentatively 
supported when a correlation is run on the composite score. There appears to be a tendency that 
overall legislative performance increases with adult prevalence. As we shall see in all but one of these 
analyses, the legislature in Malawi performs better than what would be ‘predicted’ by the statistical 
analysis, i.e. it scores higher on various indicators of performance than what would be expected by the 
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more general tendency in the data. Such ‘macro’ patterns in the data will be commented on further in 













Figure 3: Composite Score and Prevalence 
 
2. National AIDS Commissions 
As discussed in chapter two above, the opposing views in the literature on the wisdom and 
effectiveness of NACs there is clearly no dominant argument for what impact upon legislative 
performance we should expect from this variable. On the basis of Putzel251 we would hypothesize a 
negative impact, whereas the ‘Three Ones’ recommendation would hypothesise a positive impact.  
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Table B: Pearson Correlation on Number of Years with NAC 












Number of Years with 
NAC 
-.518 .351 -.145 -.427 -.640 -.256 
 8 7 8 7 6 8 
 
Law Making and Number of years with NAC 
The  is a relatively strong negative tendency between law making activity and the number of years the 
NAC has been in existence -.518 (Pearson’s r). This negative relationship tentatively confirms 
Putzel’s argument that the NAC’s have a negative impact on overall national response to the 
epidemic. It is important to note however that Uganda, with its long standing NAC may alter this 
relationship.  Uganda’s unique executive leadership around HIV/AIDS ensured a top down approach 
was taken within the country. Although the NAC was established early on in Uganda, Putzel notes 
that often the powers and role of the NAC’s are left un defined – therefore resulting in inefficiency. 
Top down leadership within Uganda may explain the negative relationship between the NAC and law 
making activity.252 




Constituency Service and duration of NAC 
There is a relatively strong relationship between constituency service and the duration of the NAC. 
However again it is important to note here that due to data limitations Uganda was not included in this 
graph, therefore the above argument that Uganda and its top down leadership was driving the 
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relationship no longer holds.  The duration of the NAC therefore is altered to a two year variation, as 
opposed to the longer duration above, and remains a negative relationship. In this scatterplot, the 
positions of Namibia and South Africa are interesting: both countries share the same electoral system 
which influences their levels of constituency service, according to Barkan.253 However, it appears that 
South Africa is performing relatively well despite the electoral system, suggesting not only that 
Namibia is underperforming but also that there may be another reason for South Africa’s and 
Mozambique’s improved responsiveness.  




3. GNI per capita (Wealth/Capacity) 
Resource constraints and general wealth of a country is frequently raised as a reason for inactivity 
around the HIV/AIDS agenda. Within the legislative context, wealth would influence the resources 
available for the legislative activities.  It is further acknowledged that resource constraints, coupled 
with weak institutions, systems of patronage and poor governance exacerbate the overall country level 
issues, compounding the problems of HIV/AIDS.254 Therefore, the hypothesis is that greater wealth 
would result in higher legislative performance. 
 
Analysis on this variable highlights two notable tendencies. There is a positive relationship between 
legislative engagement with civil society and GNI, confirming the hypothesis. However, there is a 
negative relationship between GNI and constituency service. 
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Table C: Pearson Correlation on GNI 












GNI (World Bank) -.182 .593 .025 .137 .-456 .066 
 8 7 8 7 6 8 
 
Legislative engagement with civil society and GNI 
A relatively strong relationship .593 (Pearson’s r) exists between these two variables, confirming the 
hypothesis.  This relationship is influenced by South Africa’s high level of performance and high 
levels of wealth. 




Constituency Service and GNI 
There is a strong negative relationship between GNI and constituency service. However, the 
scatterplot highlights that the position of Namibia, with regard to their low constituency service drives 
the correlation.  It is interesting to highlight that South Africa, Mozambique and Namibia all have the 
same electoral system however both Mozambique and South Africa manage to maintain relatively 
high levels of constituency service, suggesting that some other factor is at play.  Therefore it is clear 
that although there is a negative relationship between GNI and constituency service, this is may not be 
















Figure 7: Constituency Service and GNI 
 
 
4. Quality of Governance 
The quality of governance, not only in relation to HIV/AIDS but with regard to the country as a whole 
has been raised as a reason for successful or unsuccessful HIV/AIDS policies. Poor HIV policies are 
often exaggerated by existing governance weaknesses, corruption and accountability.255 According to 
Van de Walle post-colonial African states struggle under weak institutions with limited legitimacy, 
low state capacity and a propensity to focus expenditures on government consumption over 
development activities.256 Therefore the hypothesis states that countries that score better on 
governance (specifically accountability and corruption) should have better legislative performance 
around HIV/AIDS.  
 
The analysis highlights two interesting relationships, a relatively strong positive relationship between 
legislative engagement with civil society and governance, confirming the hypothesis and a fairly 
strong negative relationship between constituency service and governance.  
 
Table D: Correlations with quality of governance 














-.300 .428 .109 -.158 -.676 -.113 
N 8 7 8 7 6 8 
Legislative engagement and with civil society and quality of governance 
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The positive relationship between these two variables confirms the hypothesis. Increased quality of 
governance (improved accountability and corruption) results in better engagement with civil societies.  
Again this relationship is driven by South Africa and Namibia both of which score well on 
governance,  however both score well on legislative engagement with civil society. This suggests that 
where there is reduced corruption and improved accountability greater engagement between civil 
society and the legislature can be fostered. A potential reason for this is that an improved quality of 
governance may reduce issues of clientilism and patronage, therefore increasing the scope of civil 
society access to the legislature. However, it is important to note that if South Africa and Namibia 
were not included this would not be a particularly strong correlation.  
Figure 8: Legislative engagement with civil society and quality of governance 
 
 
Constituency Service and quality of governance 
This negative relationship is yet again influenced by the `position of Namibia although South Africa 
and Mozambique share the same electoral system – they perform better on constituency service result 
of Namibia’s low performance on constituency service.  Again the position of Malawi is of interest as 
it scores low on governance, but repeatedly high on constituency service. Both South Africa and 
Mozambique perform similarly on constituency service, which may be a negative reflection on South 















Figure 9: Constituency service and quality of governance 
 
5. Electoral System 
The choice of electoral system influences the type of activity within the parliaments as it determines 
the procedures for seat allocation, party representation and the nature of the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature.257 
 
Within the eight country selection, only two electoral systems are present; Proportional 
Representation (PR) and First Past the Post (FPTP). The differing electoral systems result in different 
levels and types of activity within the parliaments. Within PR systems constituency service is less 
important and the legislatures often tend to be weak on accountability.258 It therefore follows that 
representation of citizen’s interests is slightly less in PR systems.259 However, due to the inherent pull 
existent in all legislatures between parliamentary functions, PR systems often have more time 
allocated to legislating and other internal operations.260  FPTP systems logically have stronger 
representation, higher levels of constituency service and better accountability,261  following from the 
direct election of independent candidates in their constituencies.262   
 
Three PR systems are included in this case study. Since correlation analysis would not be suitable to 
analyse these relationships a cross-tabulation capturing the average activity across each of the 
functional variables is a useful way to analyse this data. 
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Table E: Electoral system 













PR N=3 27 72 33 69 43 49 










50   
(N=5) 
 
According to Barkan countries with a PR system will have higher levels of law making activity and 
oversight, while FPTP systems will be stronger on the legislative engagement and constituency 
service variables. Although the variation between the two systems is small and cannot conclusively 
support Barkan it appears that Barkan’s argument is tentatively confirmed within these eight 
countries.263  
 
6. Parliamentary or Presidential System 
African legislatures often find themselves struggling under ‘big man’264 politics, systems of 
clientilism and patronage,265 pulled between executing a chiefly function and modern constitutionally 
mandated legislative roles.266 Compounding the complexity is the executive struggle to control the 
legislature.267 This dynamic and political culture may be altered with the existence of a parliamentary 
or presidential system, as the constitutionally entrenched checks and balances may restrain the powers 
and reign of the executive. 
 
It is important to clearly distinguish between these two systems. This can be done based on two 
criterion; within parliamentary systems citizens cast one single ballot electing both the executive and 
the parliament simultaneously. Both the parliament and the executive have joint tenure which ends 
simultaneously. Within a presidential system, there is separate tenure, both the parliament and the 
executive are independent of each other, elected separately with separate ballots.268 
 
As with electoral system, there is insufficient variation within the case selection between 
parliamentary and presidential systems, as South Africa is the only country classified as a 
parliamentary system, according to the African Legislatures Project. 
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7. Public Opinion 
Theoretically legislatures are a mirror or pulse of society, monitoring the political and social culture, 
the general ideologies and the social mores.269 Legislatures are set up to be representative of the 
people and the society and to provide democratic governance reflective of the electorate. It follows 
that important public issues are reflected within the legislature. Analysis on two different questions 
relating to public opinion highlight some interesting relationships between the variables. As discussed 
in chapter two, the two variables are based on two questions in the Afrobarometer survey (round 3).270   
With regard to ‘prioritize AIDS’ there appears to be a strong positive relationship between legislative 
engagement with civil society as well as with constituency service.  
 
With regard to ‘critical of government’ there are two notable positive relationships; between 
progressive law making activity and the composite aggregate. It is worthwhile to note that the 
relationship between the composite aggregate and the explanatory variable is statistically significant 
at the 0.5 level. 
 
Table E: Pearson Correlation on Public Opinion 












Prioritize AIDS -.303 .463 .134 .102 -.661 -.033 
Critical of Gov’t .608 .385 .229 .261 .314 .714 
N 8 7 8 7 6 8 
 
From amongst the explanatory variables, the tendencies highlighted between both public 
opinion variables and the function variables are the most notable within this Chapter. These 
positive relationships suggest, generally speaking, that the eight parliaments are responsive to 
public opinion on AIDS. The results will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Legislative engagement with civil society and Prioritize AIDS 
The positive relationship between these two variables supports the hypothesis. Increased 
public prioritization of AIDS results in increased legislative engagement with civil society. 
This may suggest that increased public opinion around this issue galvanizes civil society to 
engage and lobby around the HIV/AIDS agenda. Of course, Mozambique’s parliament does 
not allow for such engagement and therefore does not feature well on this function. 
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Constituency Service and prioritizing AIDS 
There is a notable tendency between the variables of constituency service and the public 
opinion : prioritizing AIDS. This tendency is a negative tendency, -.661 (Pearson’s r) and is 
relatively strong. However, as with o her relationships regarding the constituency service 
function, Namibia alters the relationship negatively due to its poor performance on this 
variable. As noted above, Namibia’s poor performance can be attributed to its electoral 
system and is not a true reflection of the relationship between the variables. For this reason 
the scatterplot has not been included, although the correlation appears to be fairly strong. 
Law making and those critical of government 
On the second question relating to public opinion, those who are critical of the government’s 
response to HIV/AIDS there are two notable positive relationships. The first is between law 
making and those who are critical of government: parliaments are more active on this 
function in countries with higher level of public criticism of government. Again it is 
interesting to note the high performance of Malawi on this variable and the position of South 















attributed to the poor leadership under the Mbeki presidency. Such non responsiveness would 
seem to confirm arguments put forward by both De Waal and Mattes.271 
Figure 11: law making and critical of government 
 
 
Composite Score and critical of government 
Finally the most significant relationship .714 (Pearson’s r) is the tendency highlighted between overall 
legislative performance and the level of criticism to government’s response to HIV/AIDS. This figure 
tentatively contradicts De Waal who notes that governments have been slow in their response to 
HIV/AIDS and have performed well behind the curve on these issues. This data support the argument 
that where there is an active, critical citizenry, positive legislative performance will result. 
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‘HIV/AIDS can fame or shame Africa’s powerful presidents on a global stage, irrespective of other 
deeds and grand visions, political legacies are determined by what actions are taken around 
HIV/AIDS’272 
 It is clear from the qualitative literature on this subject, that leadership, particularly executive 
leadership plays a significant role, not only in motivating and rallying government around the issue, 
but also in placing it on the public agenda. Unfortunatly, limited quantitative data exists around 
leadership, despite its importance. Therefore, a correlation analysis cannot be run the data relating to 
leadership, as there is too little variation between the results.  Two measures of HIV Leadership have 
been considered; NCPI questionnaire which asks whether high officials speak publicly about AIDS 
efforts in major domestic for a at least twice a year; President/Head of Government, Other high 
officials, other officials in other regions and a media screen for any positive executive activity around 
HIV/AIDS.  In all of the eight countries, across both measures there was evidence of positive 
leadership.  
 
As aforementioned African governments are often ‘top heavy’273 and patriarchal274 with strong man 
presidents entrenched against weak civil societies and legislatures.275 The necessity to garner the 
                                                 
272 Strand, P. 2007, October. Comparing AIDS governance: A research agenda on responses to the AIDS epidemic. CSSR 
Working Paper No. 203. AIDS and Society Research Unity. Centre for Social Science research. Cape Town. South Africa. at 
1. 
273 Hyden, G. and Lanegran, K.1993. Aids, policy and politics: East Africa in 
comparative perspective. Policy Studies Review 12 (1).  Ebscohost. at 12. 















support and rally the strength of these leaders around the HIV/AIDS agenda becomes critical in the 
overall fight against the epidemic. Strong and successful leadership has been seen in Senegal, Uganda 
and Thailand, with powerful vertical impact on the country epidemics.276 However, despite political 
commitment voiced at international meetings, leadership around stigma, prejudice and overall 
HIV/AIDS issues remains wanting.277 To date Museveni remains the only political leader who has 
openly advocated for the use of condoms and elevated HIV/AIDS in the national arena by moving the 
National AIDS council into the office of the president.278 In Zanzibar in the 2005 the electoral 
commission included AIDS messages however these were not taken up by the political leaders 
themselves.279 It has been asserted that AIDS issues do not come with immediate rewards for 
individual MP’s, and in some circumstances may be damaging, therefore reducing their overall 
attention.280 
 
Several regional initiatives have begun to foster leadership around HIV/AIDS including the 
Champions for an HIV free Generation.281 This organisation is a collective of pertinent leaders, heads 
of state, religious leaders amongst others, who openly speak about HIV/AIDS. Positive steps taken by 
Kaunda in Zambia in the 90’s regarding public testing, and Mandela and the Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu lead the way in regard to leadership, however more needs to be done. 
Conclusion 
Although restricted to eight legislatures, this chapter highlights some of the established arguments 
used to rationalise variation in legislative activity or inactivity. The tentative findings within this 
chapter, cannot be generalised out as a measure of all African legislatures, but must be restricted to 
the case selection. It must also be noted that this exploratory analysis of legislative activity has 
occurred through a restricted lens of HIV/AIDS and therefore is not an assessment of overall 
legislative performance and activity.  
 
It is notable that the explanatory variable that appeared to have the greatest impact upon legislative 
performance is that of public opinion. This is interesting as it speaks to issue of democratic 
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governance and of HIV/AIDS. From the outset legislatures are set up to be representative, therefore 
the positive relationship between public opinion and legislative activity suggests that indeed these 
eight legislatures are indeed representative. This confirms Salih’s claim that African legislatures 
appear to be more responsive to social problems and contradicts Mattes, who argues that HIV/AIDS 
has not yet made it on to the public agenda.282 
 
Other interesting variations include the exceptionally high performance recorded within Malawi. 
Malawi is considered a relatively poor country, with limited notable leadership around HIV/AIDS 
appears to perform above expectation on many of the variables, particularly law making. Further 
research into Malawi’s high performance would be a worthwhile pursuit, potential reasons could 
include donor support, particularly active or aware civil society organisations or increased 
participation within regional organisations, such as SADC PF or SADC. Malawi’s performance is 
notable considering its relative poverty and poor governance rankings.  
 
Mozambique consistently performs poorly on legislative engagement with civil society, however it 
must be reiterated here that the Mozambique legislative system does not hold its committee meetings 
in the open, therefore the institution is not set up to allow for civil society engagement on that level. 
Mozambique therefore performs badly on this function – throughout. The influence of the electoral 
system is interesting to note in the cases of South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. With regard to 
constituency service Namibia performs particularly badly. This raises the question as to why and how 
South Africa and Mozambique manage to perform so well, despite their PR system.  
 
The relationships, albeit tentative, confirm and refute some of the more established arguments about 
the role of legislatures in the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and present some intriguing tendencies and 
arguments to be pursued in further research. This analysis raises questions as to overall government 
response, legislatures as an institution and whether or not they are valid vehicles through which to 
address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. As noted by De Waal, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been most 
successfully addressed by NGO’s, not government.283 The negative relationships between several of 
these explanatory variables, such as public opinion, the role of the NACs and the epidemiology of the 
disease may  confirm De Waal’s argument and potentially suggest that; not only are parliaments not 
responding to the epidemic, but that they may not actually be the appropriate mechanism or vehicle to 
drive government response.284 
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Despite the extraordinary achievements in the fight against HIV/AIDS since 1981 much remains to be 
done. This research highlights not only the role of legislatures in the fight against HIV/AIDS but also 
how little is in fact being done by these institutions with regard to combatting the epidemic.  Although 
this research is restricted to eight legislatures in Eastern and Southern Africa, the framework and 
tentative conclusions within this paper lay the ground for further analysis and research on this topic. 
Unfortunately, as noted by De Waal, governments often respond too late to issues of public concern. 
This appears to hold true for the legislatures in the eight countries, therefore placing an increased 
emphasis on the power of the executive and political will around issues of HIV/AIDS.285 
 
This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first comprehensive analysis of the contribution by 
African legislative responses to HIV/AIDS that is grounded in political science and extensive survey 
data. It has considered information from both qualitative and quantitative sources and collected and 
collated the data according to predetermined decision rules. This empirical study draws on literature 
located within both comparative governance and political studies to inform the framework and 
analysis.  The descriptive analysis alone is a significant contribution to comparative research on 
African legislatures. The scorecard that was created to enable cross national comparisons is also the 
first of its kind in relation to parliaments. The scorecard presents an assessment of parliamentary 
performance on five functions, each of which are composed of several data points. A sixth score – a 
composite score of parliamentary performance – was calculated on the basis of the scores on the five 
functions.  
 
Within the descriptive chapter, there is relatively low activity across all of the legislative functions. 
However, it is interesting to note a strong correlation between law making activity and constituency 
service within the eight cases. The correlation highlights that increased law making corresponds with 
increased constituency service within the eight country selection. Barkan highlights the inherent 
tension existent in all legislatures, the pull between the law making and oversight functions and the 
representative and constituency service functions.286 Within this eight country selection, and through 
the lens of HIV/AIDS, it is clear Barkan’s argument does not hold.287 This is an interesting finding – 
and one worth noting and exploring further in later research. 
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The information on the actual activity of legislatures within each of these eight countries makes a 
significant contribution to overall understanding of not only each of these cases but how better aid 
national governance of the epidemic. Results confirm that the imposition of broad frameworks or 
‘cookie cutter’ approaches are not suitable and contextual analyses of national responses are 
critical.288 This is emphasised by the variations in legislative activity within this country selection, and 
the unique challenges each of them face. 
 
In the explanatory section of this research, bivariate correlation analyses were done on the scores 
against a set of variables that have been suggested in the literature as explanations of variations in 
parliamentary performance, either in the context of AIDS or more generally. Correlations that were 
particularly strong were analysed further through scatter plots that identified how individual countries 
were placed in relation to the central tendency in the data. The statistical analysis resulted in tentative 
conclusions about what factors appear to impact on parliamentary performance on AIDS and what is 
the nature of that impact. 
 
Although the results from the correlation analyses are merely indicative of a possible causal impact, 
they highlight interesting relationships between legislative activity or parliamentary performance and 
the explanatory variables, in particular public opinion and the number of years that the overall 
response to AIDS has been coordinated by a National AIDS Commission.  
 
The negative relationship between law making and length of time with a NAC tentatively supports 
Putzel’s argument that NACs may in fact undermine the effectiveness of the AIDS response.289 The 
findings also suggest an impact from public opinion on parliamentary performance that support De 
Waal’s arguments about the delayed relationship between government performance and public 
opinion.290 A greater case selection would provide more conclusive results, as would individual 
analysis of unusual cases. However, the general tendencies that are highlighted in this research raise 
important questions about overall legislative activity around HIV/AIDS and the role of legislatures in 
country responses to the epidemic. 
 
An interesting result arises from the strong relationships between public opinion and legislative 
engagement and the overall composite score. Based on these correlations, further support is given to 
the argument that African legislatures are better at responding to social and development issues, as 
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raised by Salih.291 Furthermore, the criticisms of the representation within African legislatures appear 
to be undermined by this data as public opinion clearly has an impact on overall legislative 
performance. These tendencies and relationships suggest that an increased citizenry should be 
cultivated, and grass root activism and lobbying should be cultivated. Steps to foster a more active 
and engaged public around issues of HIV/AIDS would potentially positively influence legislative 
performance and therefore national governance around this pertinent issue. 
 
Although this study is restricted to eight parliaments, and therefore only highlights correlations rather 
than causal relationships; these findings beg further questions about the role of parliament within the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and how to strengthen legislative responses and potential ideas for in-country 
support.  Based on the strong results seen in some of the analyses, potential areas of intervention 
should focus around mobilizing public support and advocacy efforts around HIV/AIDS. Although the 
relationship between legislative responses and public opinion requires further research, tentative 
conclusions could be drawn from this data. As expected, the oversight function does not suggest 
strong performance around HIV/AIDS issues, therefore future interventions around legislative 
strengthening should look at the promotion and strengthening of oversight by MP’s. Finally, the 
recent drive for legislatures to adopt a model law on HIV/AIDS, and strengthen and set up HIV/AIDS 
committees, may have had an impact upon the overall legislative functioning, however, political 
agendas, resource constraints and political will should all be considered and factored into additional 
studies., programs and approaches.  The relatively low levels of activity across the descriptive 
variables give credence to De Waals argument as which government institutions are best suited to 
drive the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Overall the findings here make a worthwhile contribution and are a 
unique blend of various data sources to put forward an empirical analyses of eight countries within the 










                                                 






















Appendix 1: Additional Legislative Tables 
 
MP Opinions as to parliamentary influence over the content of legislation and effectiveness in 
law-making 
 
       
       
    
Parliamentary influence on 
content of legislation     
Parliamentary 
effectiveness in 
law-making   
Country too much about right too little worse stayed the same better 
Kenya 6.10% 46.90% 46.90% 14.30% 44.90% 40.80% 
Malawi 2% 63.30% 30.60% 25% 22.90% 37.50% 
Mozambique 12% 42.00% 44% 6% 30% 64% 
Namibia 71.40% 20% 8.60% 16.70% 27.80% 55.60% 
South Africa 21.90% 68.80% 9.40% 17.20% 44.80% 37.90% 
Tanzania 91.70% 8.30% 0 2.70% 10.80% 86.50% 
Uganda 4% 94.00% 2% 6% 46% 34% 
Zambia 11.90% 41.20% 41.20% 4% 35.30% 29.40% 
















Appendix 2: Additional Oversight Table 1 
MP Opinions on Oversight of Budget 
 
      
Budget       















much about right 
too 
little worse the same better 
Malawi 8.3% 75.0% 16.7% 25.0% 36.6% 35.4% 
Mozambique 0.0% 26.5% 71.4% 16.3% 14.3% 53.1% 
Namibia 12.0% 12.0% 76.0% 14.0% 26.0% 60.0% 
South Africa 2.9% 48.6% 48.6% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
Tanzania 43.7% 46.9% 43.7% 23.3% 40.0% 33.3% 
Uganda 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 2.7% 8.1% 89.2% 
Zambia 8.0% 86.0% 4.0% 6.0% 54.0% 24.0% 
  33.3% 23.6% 15.7% 21.6% 31.3% 
 
Appendix 3: Additional Oversight Table 2 
MP Opinions on Independence from Executive 
 
Independence             




Executive     
Oversight 
of the 
Executive   
  
too 
much about right 
too 





Kenya 0.0% 58.3% 41.6% 0.0% 58.3% 30.0% 
Malawi 6.1% 12.2% 81.6% 12.2% 12.2% 41.6% 
Mozambique 2.0% 50.0% 48.0% 10.0% 50.0% 44.0% 
Namibia 34.3% 34.3% 65.7% 2.9% 34.3% 48.0% 
South Africa 31.0% 40.6% 56.3% 9.4% 40.6% 56.3% 
Tanzania 2.0% 68.0% 30.0% 0.0% 68.0% 30.0% 
Uganda 0.0% 56.0% 44.0% 0.0% 56.0% 44.0% 
Zambia 13.7% 23.5% 51.0% 0.0% 23.5% 51.0% 
Appendix 4: Additional Constituency Service Table 1 

















Kenya 79.20% 69.30% 















Mozambique 34.00% 4.00% 
Namibia 0.00% 0.00% 
South Africa 34.40% 12.50% 
Tanzania 28.00% 18.40% 
Uganda 86.00% 0.00% 
Zambia 14.80% 7.90% 
   
 
 
Appendix 5: Individual Scorecard tables for each variable 
Legislative 
Scorecard                       




































































Kenya 1 1 3 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 3 
Malawi 2 2 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 8 
Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 6 
Namibia 0 0 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 2 
South Africa 1 0 2 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 4 
Tanzania 1 1 1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 3 
Uganda 0 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 




















































Kenya 0 2 1 4 2 3 2 2 16 
Malawi 1         2 1 2   
Mozambique 1 3 0 0 0 2 2 2 10 
Namibia   2 1 1 1 4 4 1 14 
South Africa 1 3 1 3 1 4 4 1 17 
Tanzania 1 2 1 2 1 4 2   12 
Uganda   3 1 2 1 3 2 3 15 
































  Majority 
Percentage 
EQUINET EQUINET EQUINET 
  
Kenya 0 1 1 1 3 
Malawi 1 2 2 0 5 
Mozambique 1       1 
Namibia 1 3 2 0 6 
South Africa 0 2     2 
Tanzania 1   0 0 1 
Uganda 0 2 0 1 3 


















                        















































Kenya 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 13 
Malawi 0                     0 
Mozambique 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 12 
Namibia 0 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 11 
South Africa 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 12 
Tanzania 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 10 
Uganda 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 3 1 1 12 
































































Kenya 3 2 2 1 1 4 4 17 
Malawi 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 23 
Mozambique 1 2 2 1 4 2 1 13 
Namibia 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 10 
South Africa 2 4 3 2 3 2 1 17 
Tanzania 2 1 1 1 4 4 3 16 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Appendix 6: Rules for Score card 
 Decision Rules or the creation of the Scorecard  
Variable  Subcategory and column number Decision Rule 
Legislative Variable (1)Number of new bills introduced that explicitly mention 
HIV in the title and  (2) New Bills passed that explicitly 
mention HIV in the title 
Calculated according to actual number of bills. 
Each bill is counted as one. 
 (3) Number of bills referred to health or HIV Committee Scores allocated (low, medium, high) 
Low = 1 -3, Medium = 3 – 6, High = 7 – 14 
 (4) Country review of National HIV Policy No review = 0 Review = 1.  
Positive score (1) allocated if no review has 
happened because National Policy is still in place 
during time of study, and review falls out of 
timeframe. 
 (5) Law that protects PLWHA from discrimination No = 0 Yes = 1 
 (6) Laws that are obstacles in the protection of 
vulnerable sub-groups. (7) Does the country have laws 
that criminalize MSM? (8) Does the country have laws 
that criminalize SW? (9) Does the country have laws that 
criminalize IDU?  
Because the existence of these laws actually 
harms overall responses to HIV/AIDS, when a 
country has these laws in place they are 
awarded a negative score. 
No = 1 Yes = -1 
 (10) Does the country have a policy on treatment care 
and support? 
No = 0 Yes = 1 
   
Civil Society Engagement 
Variable 
(1) Civil society input into new bills  This has not been given a value as the data does 
not exist for all countries 
 (2) Chair or parliamentary committee meets with civil 
society 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
 (3)Parliamentary meetings held in the open or in camera It is the general assumption that democratic 















‘demos’ therefore meetings should be held in 
the open. 
Closed = 0 
Open = 1 
 (4) Number of Civil society presentations to the 
committee 
0 – 3 = 1 
4 – 5 = 2 
6 – 10 = 3 
10+ = 4 
 (5) Is research support internal or external On the assumption that increased participation 
and input is better: 
None = 0 
Internal = 1 
Both = 2 
 (6)Percentage of MP’s who use CSO’s for input (general) 
(7) Percentage of MP’s who use Academics 
Assuming  that the higher the usage the better 
the process is overall: 
0 – 30 =1 
30 – 50 = 2 
50 – 70 = 3 
70 – 100 = 4 
 (7) NCPI value on extent of CS involvement in the 
National Strategic Plan 
3 = 1 
4 = 2 
5 = 3 
Budget Oversight (1) Parliamentary influence over oversight of the budget Unable to put a value on this and therefore it is 
not calculated in the scorecard 
 (2) Parliamentary monitoring over executive 
expenditures 
Assuming that improvement is good 
Same = 0 
Improvement = 1 
 (3)Percentage of total government spending allocated to 
health. 
Assuming that more spending is better: 
5 – 9 = 1 
10 – 12 = 2 
13 -15 = 3 
16+ = 4 
 (4) Committee budget priorities (5) Questions raised by 
the Parliament to the executive. 
Since the measure is to assess coverage and 
activity around HIV aids, and the lobbying for 
funds for HIV: 
If mention was made of : 
Budget or funds = 1 
HIV/AIDS = 2 
   
Oversight (General) (1) Is there a specific HIV/AIDS committee Assuming that having a specific committee is 
better: 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
 (2) Degree of activity within Health committee or 
committee tasked with HIV/AIDS 
Assuming more activity is better, quantified by 
the frequency of meetings: 
Not regular = 0 















Regularly = 2 
More than Quarterly = 3 
 (3) Does the Chair solicit funding If a Chair is required to solicit funding from 
external sources, there is an assumption that the 
committee does not have adequate financial 
resources to support itself, therefore no 
soliciting of funding is positive: 
No = 2 
Seldom = 1 
Often/Frequently = 0 
 (4)Sufficient funding for regular meetings (5) sufficient 
funding for travels and hearings 
These are both necessary functions of an active 
committee. If they do not have these funds 
available they are unable to perform well. 
Therefore: 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
 (6) Does the Chair have medical expertise (7) Does the 
Chair have parliamentary expertise 
Having a Chair with the expertise to oversee a 
health committee, and function properly in 
parliament is a positive measure. It could be 
suggested that committees staffed with medical 
professionals, and those with parliamentary 
expertise are better run, therefore: 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
 (8) Members have technical/professional expertise The assumption is the more members with 
expertise the better, therefore: 
Some = 1 
Many = 2 
 (9) Number of special investigations The more special investigations, the more likely 
that the committee is active, with budget and 
autonomy to determine their own activities, 
therefore: 
This is a simple numeric calculation – the 
number of investigations is the score the country 
receives. 
 (10) Committee report produced (11) Committee report 
tabled/debated/challenged 
Both of these are positives, the production of a 
well debated committee report is a good 
indication of activity and committee autonomy: 
No = 0 
Yes = 1 
   
Constituency Service 
Variable 
(1) Percentage of time devoted to constituency work: 
country mean 
The higher the percentage, the better the 
indication of the levels of constituency work: 
40% - 50% = 3 
30% - 40% = 2 
0 – 30% = 1 















Country Mean. (3) In session the length of stay in 
Constituency: Country Mean 
is an indication of more constituency work being 
done: 
1 – 2.00 = 1 
2.01 – 4.00 = 2 
4.01 – 6.00 = 3 
6.01- 7.00 = 4 
7.01 + =  (cannot include) 
 (4) Out of session, number of trips to constituency, 
country mean (5) out of session, length of stay in 
constituency, country mean 
As above – same rule applies, although different 
calculation: 
1 – 6 = 1 
6.01 – 10 = 2 
10.01 – 20 = 3 
20.01+ = 4 
 (6) Personal Donation, country mean (8) Project 
Donation, country mean 
The higher the expenditures the more work 
being done, only the means have been allocated 
a score as this provides an overall idea of 
country activity: 
0 – 200 = 1 
201 – 350 = 2 
350 – 500 = 3 
501 + = 4 
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